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Notes on Arabic Transliteration 
 
 
     
     
 	  
 	 

 	  
  
     
     
     
     
     
    ’ 
  
 
 
Long vowels are rendered , , . 
Diphthongs are rendered ay, aw. 
    	  is rendered -a in pausal forms, -at in 
 
Articles preceding “sun-letters” are not assimilated.1 
Hamzat a  is marked. 
Hamzat al-wal is not marked. 
 
 
Arabic words and names that appear in the text will be given in italics and transliterated 
according to the above remarks. Certain Arabic names and words have become well-
known to a non-Arabic audience, and seem to have obtained a standard form in the 
English language. Such names and words will be given in the English form throughout 
the text, and transliterated and given in italics in brackets only the first time they appear, 
for example: Osama bin Laden (’Usma bin Ldin ); jihad (jihd). Footnotes citing 
Arabic language sources will include the Arabic original and English translation in 
brackets. 
                                                 
1
 In cases where assimilation of article preceding a “sun-letter” has become a standard form of a name, the 
name will be given in this standard form, for example As-Sab, At-Tibyn. 
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Abstract 
 
This study examines the online media campaign of the global jihadist movement. 
It seeks to determine whether al-Qaeda has developed a strategy for its media operations, 
and to what extent the jihadist media operators adhere to such a strategy. Drawing on 
primary sources from jihadist websites, the study identifies a number of 
recommendations about the use of media offered by jihadist strategists. The study goes 
on to examine the jihadist media companies and the material they produce and distribute 
online. 
Analyzing online jihadist media material – including text, audio and video – the 
study seeks to identify primarily the modus operandi of the media campaign, target 
audiences, and strategic goals of communication. The study finds that the Internet, which 
allows the jihadists to exercise ownership and control over mass media outlets, has a 
wider functionality than mainstream media. Allowing dispersed groups and individuals to 
participate in the media jihad, the Internet also provides for increased quantity, diversity 
and decentralization of the campaign. While the jihadist online media campaign so far 
seems to have targeted mostly supporters of the global jihadist movement, a current trend 
points to increasing efforts to reach new groups, and specifically the West. 
This study offers a comparison between the jihadist strategic recommendations 
and the actual jihadist use of the Internet as a media channel, and finds a certain degree of 
coherence between the two. Yet, as both recommendations and media activity are multi-
faceted, the study concludes that there in fact exists a number of strategies, leading to a 
host of jihadist online media campaigns cohabitating the web. Although the study shows 
that the jihadists use also other media channels than the Internet, the online jihadist media 
campaign is in fact growing and frequently opening new fronts, thus pointing to a jihadist 
perception of the Internet as a purposeful vehicle for strategic communication. 
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I. Introduction and Background 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature and extent of the jihadist media 
campaign, and particularly the use of the Internet as a media channel. It has been argued 
that a ‘war of ideas’, or a ‘struggle for hearts and minds’, is a significant part of the 
conflict between the West and the global jihadist movement in the 21st century, and that a 
large part of this war is being fought in the realm of the media. Such statements are put 
forth by participants from both sides in the conflict. For example, in July 2005, Ayman 
al-Zawahari (Aymn al-awhir), al-Qaeda’s (al-Qida) second-in-command, declared 
that: “We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield 
of the media. We are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our ’umma”.2 From the 
other side, the U.S. Defense Quadrennial Report 2006 states that “Victory in the long war 
[on terrorism] ultimately depends on strategic communication by the United States and its 
international partners”.3 
Given what appears to be an increasing focus on media and communication in the 
conflict, questions arise about how the jihadists influence communication, using media 
outlets that allow ownership and control over information. According to a 2006 
International Crisis Group report, “the role played by such forms of communication 
appears to have been systematically undervalued”.4 Nevertheless, former U.S. Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld has expressed concerns about the allegedly successful manipulation 
of the media by terrorists, stating that: “Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting 
wars in today’s media age, but [...] our country has not”.5 
                                                 
2
 Untitled Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, intercepted by American intelligence, July 2005, available 
in Arabic original and English translation, www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_arabic, (accessed 22 
March, 2007). 
3
 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 92, 
www.defenselink.mil/qdr/ (accessed 10 March, 2007). 
4
 International Crisis Group, In their own words: Reading the Iraqi insurgency, Middle East Report No. 50, 
15 February 2006, www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953&l=1 (accessed 10 February 2007). 
5
 “US losing media war to al-Qaeda”, BBC News, 17 February 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4725992.stm (accessed 12 June, 2006). Indeed, Rumsfeld’s comments 
may stem from the rather limited success of some of the public diplomacy initiatives instigated by the U.S. 
since 9/11 2001, including the establishment of media outlets in the Middle East, See Smith and von 
Hippel, “Ideology and the battle of ideas”, in Smith and Sanderson (ed.), Five years after 9/11: An 
Assessment of America’s War on Terror, Washington D.C.: CSIS Press, 2006. 
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The jihadists seem, in fact, to have undertaken a vast media campaign. The 
increasing number of jihadist-controlled media outlets that have been established over the 
last years is particularly noteworthy. Arguably, one of the main reasons for this 
phenomenon is the expanding access to new media, and especially the Internet, which 
offer new ways and effects of communication. It also may stem from an increased and 
widely promulgated awareness of the possible benefits of the use of the media and the 
Internet for terrorist activities. 
 
A preliminary hypothesis for this study therefore suggests that the jihadist 
movement operates within a pronounced strategy concerning the use of the media, and 
that the Internet plays a crucial role in this strategy, facilitating the accomplishment of 
strategic goals for communication. 
 
This hypothesis is supported by previous research in the field of ‘terrorism and 
the media’, and will be further developed after a review of the relevant literature. The 
study will subsequently examine the hypothesis by analyzing empirical data. First, 
strategic documents, speeches and letters of prominent jihadists will be studied in order to 
identify a possible declared media strategy. Second, the jihadists’ own online media 
outlets and the material they produce will be analyzed in order to determine the nature 
and extent of this phenomenon. Finally, the study will attempt to compare the declared 
goals of communication with the actual jihadist use of online media with a view to 
establishing whether there exists a comprehensive, applied media strategy on the part of 
al-Qaeda. 
 
2. Methodology 
As a basic interpretative qualitative examination, this study seeks to “discover and 
understand a phenomenon or a process, and the perspectives and worldviews of people 
involved”.6 Components of such qualitative studies include data reduction, data display, 
                                                 
6
 Merrian, Sharan B. and Associates, Qualitative Research in Practice, Examples for Discussion and 
Analysis, California: Jossey-Bass, 2002. 
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and conclusion drawing.7 It is important to bear in mind that the researcher is the main 
instrument for data collection and analysis. Subsequently, the study has to a certain 
degree an inevitable subjective approach. It should, however, be inter-subjectively 
comprehensible, hence offering transparency of research procedures and being 
comparable to other studies in order to facilitate verifications of reliability and validity.8 
Qualitative studies can be inductive or deductive, i.e. building or testing theories and 
hypotheses.9 This study will, deductively, test some existing theories about terrorism and 
the media, but as it strives to understand the specific and relatively new phenomenon of 
jihadism and the Internet, it will also inductively seek to reach new understandings. 
As the focus is placed on the phenomenon of global jihadism, most of the data 
used in this study will be collected directly from jihadist sources. Many of these sources 
have previously been left out of similar examinations. One can argue that this is not 
necessarily a product of their relative insignificance, but rather because of their difficult 
accessibility: the sources are mostly in the Arabic language, and, probably due to the 
illegal nature of the jihadist movement, much of the material is guarded, for example, by 
password-protected websites. Tellingly, the most prominent jihadist websites have a 
password protection system. This does, however, not necessarily mean that these are the 
sole sources of authentic material, and much of the material on protected websites 
ultimately reaches other open sites, sometimes also in translation. The author has had 
access to some such restricted material, but has, when possible, used open and 
extensively distributed media in the research. Yet, one can argue that the use of, and 
reference to, the guarded sources partially obstructs the transparency of the research in 
this study. 
Another aspect in this regard is the more general issue of using websites as 
primary sources. Consideration of authenticity, authority, purpose, accuracy and nature of 
sources - criteria for all research - are particularly important when dealing with the 
Internet, which potentially allows any individual to publish any type of content. Another 
                                                 
7
 Miles, Matthew B. and A. Micheal Huberman, An expanded Sourcebook, Qualitative Data Analysis, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Second edition 1994. 
8
 Mayring, Philipp, Qualitative Content Analysis, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative 
Social Research [On-line Journal], 1(2), June 2002, http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/2-00/2-
00mayring-e.htm, (accessed 20. November, 2006). 
9
 Merrian, Sharan B. and Associates, Qualitative Research in Practice, Examples for Discussion and 
Analysis. 
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concern is the sometimes short validity of URLs, which, like password protection of sites, 
restricts re-examination of sources. Yet, the topic of this study – online media – requires 
the use of websites as primary sources. Therefore, all source material is filed in the 
author’s archive and can be accessed upon request. 
The empirical jihadist media samples used in the analysis of this study date from a 
timeframe of four months, from September to December 2006. However, the author has 
studied the field since 2005, and some previously gathered media material will be 
incorporated in this study in order to present a more comprehensive picture of the jihadist 
media campaign: Empirical data concerning the media strategy will include older 
material, as a strategy denotes a long-term plan, and therefore should be proposed before 
the actual plan is put into action.10 Furthermore, since the jihadist online media campaign 
is ongoing, the author has chosen to mention some significant developments that have 
taken place after this period. These developments further illustrate the media jihad as it 
emerges from the period of research. 
 
Empirical Data 
The qualitative research methodology that will be employed in this study seeks to 
use as broad an empirical data base as possible. This data base can be separated into two 
main categories. 
The first category consists of data that shed light on the jihadists’ own 
perspectives on the use of media. It includes texts of various natures, from written letters 
to audio-visual speeches, and covers ideological and strategic material. The material is 
all, however, produced by jihadists and includes comments on the use of the media. 
These texts will be examined in an attempt to determine whether there exists a 
pronounced media strategy. The second category of data comprises the jihadist media 
themselves. As mentioned above, the focus will be on online media channels or 
publications. These data are primary sources and prima facie evidence of the present state 
of the jihadist online media use. They will be subject to a qualitative content analysis, and 
tested against the research hypothesis.11  By comparing the results of the analysis of data 
                                                 
10
 See definition of ‘strategy’, Part I, Chapter 5, in this study. 
11
 Since the 1980s, content analysis has become an increasingly important tool and the fastest growing 
technique in media analysis. See Neuendorf, K. A, The Content Analysis Guidebook, Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2002. 
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from the two categories, the study hopes to indicate the level of coherence between the 
jihadists own ‘theory of communication’ and their ‘practice of communication’. This, 
again, is a potential sign of the existence or absence of a comprehensive, applied jihadist 
media strategy. 
Because of the relatively large amount of information often available to a 
researcher, content analysis is generally based on a sample of text, sound, or picture. 
Unlike statistical sampling that seeks accurate representations of an informational 
entirety, content analysts seek information that is relevant to the research question: 
“Texts must be sampled in view of what they mean, the interpretations they enable, and 
the information they contain”.12 A number of different techniques for sampling in content 
analysis exist, from random to systematic selection. This study employs three different 
techniques. Regarding the first category of empirical information – the jihadist ‘theory of 
communication’ – a technique called relevance or purposive sampling will be used. This 
practice implies the selection of all informational units relevant to the research question, 
and requires preliminary examination of the texts that will be analyzed. The analyst then 
systematically lowers the number of units that need to be considered for an analysis. The 
final sample is thus not meant to be “representative of a population of texts, but rather the 
population of relevant texts”.13 However, a problem associated with relevance sampling 
which may relate to this study pertains to the large amount of irrelevant information 
available on the Internet.14 This study seeks to circumvent the problem by using Internet 
sources only issued by specific sources, namely the jihadists themselves. The second 
category of empirical data – the media material issued by the jihadist media companies – 
is selected by a combination of stratified and random sampling. Stratified sampling 
recognizes distinct strata within a population of media material. In this study, the strata of 
jihadist media material include for example magazines, audio files, videos, and TV 
broadcast, and one example from each category available is selected. The final sample is 
selected randomly from these strata.15 
 
                                                 
12
 Krippendorff, Klaus, Content Analysis, An Introduction to Its Methodology, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage 
Publications, 2004, p. 113. 
13
 Ibid, p. 119. 
14
 Ibid, p.120. 
15
 For a survey of different sampling techniques, see ibid, pp.111-124. 
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Operational Qualitative Content Analysis 
Content analysis serves different purposes, such as describing characteristics of 
communication and making inferences about the antecedents and consequences of 
communication.16 This kind of analysis scrutinizes different elements of communication, 
namely the source, the channel, the message and the recipient. According to Ole R. 
Holsti, such an analysis may be operationalized by asking the questions who, why, how, 
what, to whom, and with what effect.17 While the answer to the last question regarding 
consequences of communication certainly could be interesting, it lies outside the scope of 
this study. The other elements will therefore form the basis of analysis for the data 
gathered in category one and two, e.g. the jhadist strategic texts and the media material. 
In content analysis, the question ‘who?’ traditionally arises in order to determine 
the authorship of a text. In this study, most of the authors of texts or producers of 
multimedia are known - indeed, as a requirement of the study, all material examined 
come from members of the global jihadist movement and their media organizations. In 
stead of settling questions of disputed authorships, then, the study will simply provide 
information about the specific authors and analyze the (latent) meaning of the use of 
different actors in different material and for different purposes. The question ‘what?’ can 
be answered directly from a description of the attributes of content, thus largely 
circumventing potential problems of validity. Answers to the question ‘how?’ also follow 
from characteristics of content, but specifically from analyses of techniques of persuasion 
and style. Aspects of the analysis may include word count, presentational style, and the 
use of loaded terms and symbols. ‘To whom?’-inquiries relate known attributes of the 
audience to messages produced for them. The communicator is often said to form 
messages in the idiom of the intended audience, or to reflect values of the intended 
audience. The validity of such interpretations is to a large degree obtainable from 
attributes of the content. Regarding jihadist literature and media material, the message is 
often dedicated to a certain audience. While such a dedication, however, may be merely 
rhetorical, other attributes indicate target audience: For example, the use of Western 
languages may imply a Western public; religious references seem to indicate Muslim 
audiences; strong legitimization of activities may illustrate the targeting of potential 
                                                 
16
 Holsti, Ole R., Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading, Mass: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, 1969. 
17
 Ibid. The following information about applied content analysis ibid, unless otherwise noted. 
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supporters that need to be convinced of the cause and methods, whereas lack of 
legitimization seemingly indicates an already supportive audience. Other correlations 
between communicator and audience will be observed during the analysis. Finally, the 
question ‘Why?’ is posed in order to reveal a pragmatic dimension of the communication. 
Answers to this question treat motives, values, intentions and strategies of the producer of 
content. The validity of these inferences is difficult to test without further information 
from the communicators. Yet, it is possible to establish propaganda goals or strategies 
underlying the characteristics of content through an indirect method which “requires 
logic-of-the-situation reasoning and the use of generalizations other than the one-to-one 
type of correlation”.18 The ‘why?’ question tests part of the hypothesis of this study 
which concerns the jihadists’ strategic goals of communication. 
Holsti’s method places itself within an analysis tradition that views content as a 
property of the source of a text.19 Critics of this method, like Krippendorff, argue that 
such an approach fails to acknowledge the analyst’s conceptual contributions to the 
reading of a text, and that it ignores the fact that the message or content may have 
multiple meanings.20 He rather recommends a context-based analysis. Pertaining to this 
issue, Holsti treats the issue of manifest versus latent meaning, and states that “reading 
between the lines” is important in the interpretation stage in order to draw meaningful 
conclusions from the data.21 This study’s use of content analysis will include the 
perspective of contexts and latent meanings. 
 
3. Previous Research 
The following survey of previous research on terrorism and the media seeks to 
provide a basis for understanding the phenomenon of jihadism and online 
communication, and aims to facilitate the establishment of a research hypothesis for this 
study. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 George, A. L., quoted in Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, p. 70. 
19
 Krippendorff, Content Analysis, An Introduction to Its Methodology. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, p. 12. 
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Media and Terrorism 
Research in the field of terrorism and the media has, with little dissention, 
concluded that the two phenomena are closely linked.22  Many definitions of terrorism 
contain the aspect of communication, and even more specifically the media: “If terrorism 
is a strategy characterized by symbolic attacks on symbolic targets, it is also a strategy 
characterized by the intentional manipulation of the news media”.23 This statement 
describes one side of the relationship, while the other side is illustrated by the claim that 
“dangerous media hype of terrorist ‘spectaculars’ [is the result of] fierce competition of 
an increased market share of the audience”.24 This reveals a symbiotic relationship, in 
which terrorism is dependent on the media, in order to spread a message, and the media 
on terrorism, not only to sell their product, but also in order to satisfy an ever increasing 
news- and sensation-thirsty public.25 Yet, despite a mutual need between the two, the 
relationship also involves mutual distrust.26 While, on the one hand, terrorists often feel 
used by the media in sensational reporting that may fail to mention their grievances and 
goals, the media, on the other hand, may have reason to fear terrorists as journalists on 
several occasions have become the victims of terrorist acts. Furthermore, it is worth 
keeping in mind that terrorism is a phenomenon that long precedes modern mass media, 
and that the spread of terror historically has relied on oral communication: The violent 
wing of the Zealots, the Sicarii of the 1st century, as well as the Assasin sect of Shiite 
Islam operating in the Middle Ages, spread their terror by word of mouth in the mosques 
and marketplaces.27 One may therefore argue that the development of the mass media is 
hardly the primary cause for the spread of terrorism and can certainly not be blamed for 
its existence. Yet, developments in media have been seen in relation to developments in 
terrorism, and researchers have argued that paradigmatic shifts in mass media have been 
                                                 
22
 For a contrasting view, see Michel Wieviorka, who argues in favor of a less significant relationship 
between terrorism and media, and promotes four kinds of relationships: “pure indifference”, “relative 
indifference”, “media-oriented strategy”, and “total-break”, in Wieviorka, Michel, The making of terrorism, 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993, pp. 43-44. 
23
 Martin, Gus, Understanding Terrorism. Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2003, p. 281. 
24
 Wilkinson, Paul, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, 
No. 2, Summer 1997, p. 55. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Wilkinson, Paul, “The Media and International Terrorism”, in Crenshaw, M.  and J. Pimlott (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1997, p. 675. 
27
 Ibid. 
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accompanied by new and more deadly forms of terrorism.28 Technological innovations 
within the printing press during the 19th century were readily used for communication 
purposes by Russian and Balkan anarchists. Moreover, the year 1968 has been said to 
mark both the launch of the first television satellite and the birth of international 
terrorism. Live audio-visual broadcast to an international audience may have forwarded 
more spectacular forms of terrorism, exemplified by Palestinian terrorists’ airliner 
hijacking operations in Europe in the 1970s.29  
 
With the development of mass media, modern terrorism has been portrayed as an 
act of communication,30 and has specifically been named “mass-mediated terrorism”, 
indicating an existential link between terrorism and publicity via the mass media.31 As 
terrorism is often politically motivated violence, it usually aims at conveying a specific 
message, often to governments and policymakers. The immediate victims of terrorism 
may be randomly or selectively chosen, yet they are often merely instrumental in the 
terrorists’ calculus of obtaining both publicity and impact on the enemy target and a 
wider audience through the media.32  This description identifies some of the participants 
in what has been called “the informational battlefield”33 - a battlefield in modern 
conventional conflicts, but particularly in asymmetrical conflicts in which terrorists are 
often involved. Thus, mass communication technologies appear to have become weapons 
of war, and the phrase ‘information is power’ has become something of a truism.34 In 
order to obtain power (of information), terrorists, who feel they lack access to traditional 
mass media communication as they do not share the mainstream views of society, have 
come to understand that they can adapt their methods and styles of violence to attract the 
media.35 These adaptations include the degree of violence applied, the attack on symbolic 
targets, and the performance of very spectacular deeds.36 
                                                 
28
 Lia, Brynjar, Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism, London and New York: Routledge, 2005. 
29
 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.  
30
 Schmid and de Graaf, Violence as Communication, London: Sage Publications, 1982. 
31
 Nacos, Brigitte L., Mass-Mediated Terrorism, The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Maryland, 2002. 
32
 Schmid and de Graaf, Violence as Communication. 
33
 Martin, Understanding Terrorism. Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, p. 289. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Nacos, Brigitte L., Mass-Mediated Terrorism, The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism. 
36
 Martin, Gus, Understanding Terrorism. Challenges, Perspectives and Issues. 
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The above discussion focuses on the relationship between terrorism and the 
international and national mass media. It is, however, important to bear in mind that, as 
Wilkinson pointed out in 1997, terrorists communicate on two different levels: 
“The mass media provides a means to get the terrorist message to the population at large, 
but rarely replace the terrorists’ own press releases, communiqués, pamphlets and 
magazines, [however] the terrorists’ own methods of propaganda generally have very 
little circulation” .37 
This is an important point, and while the latter part of the statement may have been true 
almost a decade ago, it can be questioned in light of today’s expanded use of the Internet. 
However, also more recently, Brigitte L. Nacos touches upon this issue as she states that 
traditional media are more important in terrorists’ publicity calculus than the Internet. At 
the same time, though, she describes the Internet as a means of bypassing the gatekeepers 
of traditional media, thus offering terrorists nearly unlimited communication.38 Another 
assessment which supports the idea that terrorists benefit from using their own media 
outlets, such as the Internet, rises from findings that traditional media coverage does not 
lead to public approval,39 either of the terrorists or their causes.40 The attention that so-
called sensationalist media coverage lends to terrorism is rarely positive and often does 
not portray terrorists and their causes in the way that the terrorists perhaps would wish 
for. This indicates that news prepared and presented by the terrorists themselves 
potentially could be more advantageous to their cause. 
 
 The advent of the Internet constitutes one of the most recent paradigmatic shifts in 
mass media, and may therefore be expected to have profound impact on the nature of 
terrorism. Specific studies about the Internet and terrorist groups point to a number of 
aspects that have been influenced by this new technology, ranging from finance, training, 
data collection, and operational tactics, and the shaping of public opinion and 
communication.41 Gabriel Weimann usefully separates between the instrumental and the 
communicative use of the Internet by terrorists.42 He states that “at this point, terrorists 
                                                 
37
 Wilkinson, Paul, “The Media and International Terrorism”, p. 675. 
38
 Nacos, Brigitte L., “Terrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication”, in Hamilton, Daniel S. 
(ed.), Terrorism and International Relations, Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006. 
39
 Downes-LeGuin, Theo and Bruce Hoffman, The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion: 1988 to 1989, 
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-225-F.F/RC, 1993. 
40
 Laquer, Walter, The Age of Terrorism, Boston: Little, Brown, 1987. 
41
 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism. 
42
 Weimann, Gabriel, Terror on the Internet, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
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are using the Internet for propaganda and communication more than they are attacking 
it”.43 The communicative aspect includes using the Internet to advance an organization’s 
political, religious and ideological agenda. It is also said to facilitate new relationships 
between an individual and a virtual community.44 In the case of jihadism and the Internet, 
al-Qaeda is labeled “unique among all terrorist groups” in understanding the 
communicative potential of the Internet.45 With a widespread network of websites46, 
allowing flow of information from leaders to supporters, and among supporters, the 
“online propaganda strategy of al-Qaeda takes advantage of the anonymity and flexibility 
of the Internet”.47 The paradigmatic shift in terrorism caused by the Internet lies primarily 
in the possibility to “bypass censorship and communicate directly with external 
audiences”, exemplified by the copious Internet-transmitted beheadings of hostages by 
salafi-jihadists in Iraq in 2004.48 
 A growing body of scholarly studies treats jihadism and the use of the Internet as 
a media channel. Dr. Brynjar Lia argues that jihadist web media production differs from 
traditional media production in that it expands the quantity and quality of the material.49 
Furthermore, media producers sometimes seem to have a weak organizational affiliation 
to militant groups or to command structure, which allows them to speak with a relatively 
autonomous voice, and to operate along lines of network and not of hierarchical 
structures.50 Another study on the online jihadist media campaign concludes that as 
technology permits widespread distribution of the global jihadist message, the 
opportunity arises for forging transnational alliances and interaction between dispersed 
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points.51 The jihadist online media campaign potentially maintains and increases the 
social base of support, promotes amateur terrorism, and preserves the narrative of modern 
jhadism.52 In addition to such academic studies, policy papers and magazine and 
newspaper articles provide frequent, if only partial, examinations of the jihadist media 
campaign and the media companies.53 Furthermore, several individuals and private 
organizations monitor and analyze jihadist groups’ daily activities, including media 
efforts, on the Internet, and present their findings on their websites. 54  
 
Finally, when studying the media and terrorism, researchers have typically sought 
to decipher the various ways that terrorists use the media. A much-cited study by Schmid 
and de Graaf identifies as many as 30 different insurgent terrorist uses of the news 
media.55 The list includes both active and passive uses, ranging from “communication of 
(fear-) messages to audience” to “obtaining information about public reaction to 
terroristic acts”.56 The list seems comprehensive, but, as the authors note, is primarily a 
survey of examples with overlapping elements. Furthermore, scholars within the field 
have pointed to incoherence in Schmid and de Graaf’s list: it mixes strategic and tactical 
uses of the media.57 
While Schmid and de Graaf’s study deals with terrorism as a phenomenon, other 
more recent studies specifically treat jihadism and its media strategies. A 2006 study by 
Corman and Schiefelbein, entitled “Communication and Media Strategy in the Jihadi War 
of Ideas”, concludes that the most important jihadist strategic uses of the media are to 
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legitimate and propagate the movement, and to intimidate opponents.58 The study 
furthermore stresses the importance of “sophisticated, modern methods of 
communication and public relations” for the jihadist movement, and points to how 
jihadists use both traditional mass media and new media channels. Yet, the study relies 
primarily on older al-Qaeda documents, and the authors acknowledge the risk that it may 
be analyzing an organization of the past. Nevertheless, its assessments on the jihadist use 
of the media are functional, and will, along with supplementary theories, serve as 
framework for this study. 
 
A Constructivist Approach: Framing Terrorism 
According to the above assessments, terrorism itself can be viewed as political 
communication. Perhaps more than the deed, though, the actual terrorist message, 
presented in text, picture or audio-visual format, qualifies as such communication. Media 
communication in general, and political communication in particular, has long been 
subject to the theory of framing. The term framing refers to the selection of some aspects, 
and exclusion of others, of a perceived reality. By emphasizing certain aspects, making 
them more salient in a communicating text, a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation is promoted.59 
The concept of news framing thus refers to how media channels present a topic 
within interpretative structures, thereby, consciously or unconsciously, promoting one 
particular interpretation of events.60 News framing is related to the concept of agenda-
setting, and has been explained as its second level. Agenda setting, at a first level, puts a 
particular issue, event or actor on the audience’s mind, and framing, at a second level, 
makes some aspects of the matter more salient than others.61 These two processes 
represent an important aspect of political communication, as it is expected that they 
influence the public opinion. Therefore, it is likely that governments and interest groups 
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alike will make an effort to make their frame the valid one, and hence used by the media 
channels. 62 
Concerning terrorism, it is suggested that “terrorist events are commonly 
understood through news frames that simplify, prioritize, and structure the narrative flow 
of events”.63 It appears that the U.S. government created a certain frame with its rhetoric 
after the 9/11 terrorist events, introducing the ‘war on terror’. The interpretation of the 
events included ‘an act of war’ on civilization (problem definition) by evil people (moral 
evaluation) motivated by hate of freedom (causal interpretation) against which the world 
should unite through a ‘war on terror’ (treatment recommendation).64 It is important to 
bear in mind that the development of a frame suggests that the events could be interpreted 
in alternative ways. In the case of 9/11, many groups disagreed with the U.S. official 
frame, among them the jihadists, representing the other side in the conflict. It is likely, 
then, that they have developed their own frames and that they use alternatives to 
mainstream media to present the events from their point of view.  
 
Theories of framing indicate that communication is not simply the transmission of 
data, but suggest that individuals play a vital role in constructing meaning. 65 This idea 
places itself within the broader theory of constructivism, also called social 
constructivism. Constructivism appeared primarily in the late 1960s, advanced by the 
seminal work “The Social Construction of Reality” by Berger and Luckman.66 It became 
an increasingly important approach in the field of International Relations (IR) in the 
1980s offering an alternative to the well established theories of realism and liberalism. 
However, constructivism places itself in the much earlier sociological tradition, with 
                                                 
62
 Pan, Zhongdang and Gerald M. Kosicki, “Framing as a Strategic Action in Public Deliberation”,  in 
Reese et.al (ed.), Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World, 
New Jersey and London: LEA Publishers, 2001.  
63
 Norris, Pippa, Montague Kern and Marion Just (ed.), Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the 
Government and the Public, p.10. 
64
 Archetti, Christina, “Understanding what shapes the news: The elite press and the framing of 9/11 in the 
US, France, Italy and Pakistan”, Paper presented at the Conference Media Change and Social Theory, 
Oxford, UK, 6-8 September 2006. 
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/staff/c.archetti/Understanding_What_Shapes_the_News.doc (accessed 2 June, 2007). 
65
 Delwiche, Aaron, “Agenda setting, opinion leadership, and the world of Web logs”, First Monday Peer-
reviewed journal on the Internet, www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_12/delwiche/index.html (accessed 
November 2006). 
66
 Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality, A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge, New York: Garden City, 1966. 
 23 
strong roots in the works of Emil Durkheim and Max Weber.67 Durkheim’s theories on 
the role of ideational factors in social life and how ideas become socially constructive are 
of importance to constructivism. The same goes for Weber’s approach to the normative, 
as well as instrumental, roles of meaning and significance: “We are cultural beings 
endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and 
lend it significance”.68 Constructivism, consequently, deals with human consciousness 
and its role in international society. It distinguishes between a material reality and a 
social reality, and claims that social reality is constructed and therefore always 
susceptible to change.69 Rather than asking what social realities are, IR constructivists ask 
how social realities become what they are. Constructivists generally focus on the causal 
force of ideational, discursive, and linguistic factors in world politics, and argue in favor 
of a reconceptualization of power, with relevance for amongst others non-state actors. 
Furthermore they highlight the role of transnational movements and processes in 
international affairs.70 
Given this brief introduction to constructivism in international relations, the 
statement that “constructivism seemed to be the best placed [approach] to account for 
such a religious, transnational movement [like] al-Qaeda”71 appears reasonable. In a 2006 
article, Marc Lynch claims that al-Qaeda, as part of the global jihadist movement, “has 
undergone a ‘constructivist turn’, employing not only violence but also a dizzying array 
of persuasive rhetoric and public spectacle toward the end of strategic social 
construction”.72 According to Lynch, al-Qaeda, with its Islamist ideas, is inherently 
constructivist in its orientation.73 But, allegedly, also structural factors have led to this 
turn. These structural factors include the absence of a territorial base, and a globalized 
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field of contention shaped by new media and information technologies. With these new 
media technologies, al-Qaeda frames the world politics as a clash of civilizations, 
focusing on the salience of religion, and places the power of radical Islamism on the same 
level as that of the state system.74 This may point to a jihadist attempt to create a 
competing frame to the U.S. ‘war on terror’-frame mentioned above. For the purpose of 
this study, which focuses on the global jihadist movement and its use of new media 
technologies, a constructivist approach will be applied to help interpret the meaning and 
significance that the actors, the jihadists, ascribe to their collective situation. While the 
study does not aim to explore the jihadist message or ideology, it will take a 
constructivist approach in its attempts to decipher the frames used in jihadist media. 
 
4. Formulation of Research Hypothesis 
The theories and assessments mentioned above form a broad basis for 
approaching the jihadist media. The main purpose of this study is to define the nature and 
extent of the jihadist media campaign, and specifically the use of jihadist-controlled 
online media channels. Previous research suggests that the media play an essential role 
for terrorists, and specific research on jihadism today indicates a vital role for new media 
technologies, such as the Internet. These two observations constitute the starting point of 
this study. 
From a constructivist point of view, the jihadist message, spread through online 
channels, can be seen as a socially constructed idea, framed by the specific jihadist 
worldview. Using precisely the Internet as a media channel, it seems that the jihadists are 
able to present news stories within a jihadist frame. This study therefore suggests that the 
possibilities for agenda-setting and framing may be among the main reasons for 
establishing and using these channels. 
Moreover, the message may strategically aim at certain goals. This brings us back 
to the reasons for using media, or in this case using the Internet as a media channel. 
Corman and Schiefelbein’s study on jihadist media strategy proposed three main strategic 
goals of communication: legitimization, propagation and intimidation. It is furthermore 
useful to look to Schmid and de Graaf’s influential list of terrorist uses of the media. 
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Despite the fact that these uses are not specific to jihadism, and do not take into 
consideration the use of new media technologies, many seem to be valid for this study.75 
Interestingly, when re-categorizing the alleged overlapping, yet relevant, terrorist media 
uses in Schmid and de Graaf’s list, the same three strategic goals as mentioned above - 
legitimization, propagation and intimidation - emerge.76 One may therefore go on to 
assume that these three goals – purportedly the most important in media communication 
for terrorists, in general, and jihadists, in particular – also will be observed when 
examining the current media jihad. Consequently, one may suggest a hypothesis which 
states that the jihadists use the media in order to propagate the movement and the cause, 
legitimize the movement and its activities, and intimidate opponents. 
An analysis of empirical data will determine if the goals of the media jihad, both 
from a strategic perspective designed by jihadist strategists, and in reality as seen through 
the media channels, correspond with these proposed uses. Furthermore, it seems 
interesting to assess whether a theoretical framework proposed mainly for traditional 
media also applies to the study of new media such as the Internet. 
 
The research hypothesis could be summarized as follows: The jihadists operate 
within a pronounced strategy concerning the use of the media. The Internet, playing a 
crucial role in this media strategy, allows the jihadists to directly frame their message, 
and is used in order to reach the following strategic goals of communication: 
propagation of movement and the cause, legitimization of movement and activities, and 
intimidation of opponents. 
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5. Definition of Terms 
Before embarking on a further discussion and an analysis of the jihadist use of the 
media, a few terms central to the research hypothesis of this study need to be defined. 
The following definitions provide information about the background of certain terms, as 
well as their significance for the purpose of this specific study.  
 
Terrorism  
The saying ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ reflects the 
seemingly inherent difficulties in defining terrorism. On a global level, several attempts 
to reach a common definition have been unsuccessful, and governments, international 
organizations and private agencies thus operate with separate characterizations of the 
phenomenon. Scholars in IR and related fields often employ the UN Academic 
Consensus Definition: 
"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-
) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political 
reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the 
main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target 
population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication 
processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used 
to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of 
demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought" (Schmid, 1988).77 
However, modern terrorism allegedly differs in character from traditional terrorism, often 
lacking a discernible organizational structure or an identified central command, and 
operating with less easily defined aims or identified objectives, which potentially makes 
it more lethal.78 Modern terrorism furthermore often incorporates an international or 
transnational aspect, adding the involvement of “citizens or the territory of more than one 
country”.79 
Global jihadism may be defined as modern terrorism, and will be further defined 
below. First, however, a closer look at how the jihadists themselves use the term 
terrorism seems warranted: Despite the fact that terrorism, in contemporary use, is 
commonly perceived as highly pejorative, denoting a lack of legitimacy and morality, and 
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that, consequently, very few groups have described themselves as terrorist, the jihadists 
regularly promote themselves as ’irhbiyyn (“terrorists”). One may, however, argue that 
the Arabic word, from the root r-h-b, carries different connotations than the English one. 
The jihadist ideologue ’Ab Muab al-Sr claims that “‘terrorism’ is an abstract word 
[which] can carry a good or a bad meaning”, adding “we refuse to understand this term 
according to the American description”.80 Al-Sr separates between “blameworthy 
terrorism” (’irhb madhmm) and praiseworthy terrorism (’irhb mamd), the latter 
indicating terrorism by the righteous that have been unjustly treated. A Quranic verse 
which is often used by today’s jihadists to legitimate terrorism in Islam is verse 60 of 
Srat al-Anfl, which calls to "prepare to strike terror into the enemies of God" (Q 8:60). 
Subsequently, the deceased Saudi cleric Shaykh amd bin Uql’ al-Shuayb stated that 
terrorism may be “legitimate, sanctioned and ordered by God, [and] is to prepare strength 
and be mobilized for resisting the enemies of God and his prophets.”81 Based on the same 
arguments, convicted Bali bomber Mukhla concluded in his writings: “This is why the 
word irhabii is popular with Arabs to refer to a terrorist”.82 
 
Global Jihadism 
The concept of jihad (jihd) goes back to early Islamic jurisprudence, and is 
sometimes referred to as the sixth pillar of Islam, although it has no official status.83 The 
basis of the jihad is generally found in the Quran (al-Qur’n), the sunna and the ’adth 
(plural of adth), denoting the transmissions of statements and actions of the Prophet 
Mohammad.  
Jihad literally means “striving”, and denotes any activity, personal or communal, 
carried out by a Muslim in order to follow the path of God. Certain scholars, particularly 
Shiites, separate between the greater and the lesser jihad. The greater jihad is the 
personal, nonviolent struggle to lead a good Muslim life. The lesser jihad, however, is the 
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violent struggle for Islam. This latter striving is the usual meaning of jihad.84 Stemming 
from a fundamental principle of the universality of Islam, jihad consists of military action 
with the objective of defending Dr al-’Islm (the Abode of Islam) against external 
aggression, and also of the expansion of Islam. As such, jihad has been presented as an 
obligation for Muslims. The individual obligation is called far ayn, and denotes the 
duty of all Muslims to take part in jihad. It may include direct fighting, financial 
contribution, charity or prayers. The far kifya denotes the collective obligation to wage 
jihad.85 The doctrine of jihad in modern Islam furthermore emphasizes jihd al-dawa, 
indicating the spread of Islam by peaceful means, also termed jihd al-lisn (“jihad of the 
tongue”) or jihd al-qalam (“jihad of the pen”).86 Disregarding previous doctrine and 
historical traditions, some modern Islamic scholars have argued that this is the most 
important form of jihad nowadays, as intensive communication is possible without 
having to resort to military expeditions.87 In fact, today’s global jihadist movement, as we 
will see, combines the violent jihad with the jihad of the tongue and the pen. Yet, the 
current jihadist media campaign is a supplement to violent activities, and would make 
little sense alone, as it to a large extent works to promote violence and to place the 
violence within a political and religious framework.    
 
Within the history of modern militant Islamism, dating back to the 1930s, global 
jihadism is a relatively new phenomenon. It appeared in the mid-1990s when Osama bin 
Laden (’Usma bin Ldin) declared the West to be the greatest enemies of the Muslim 
world, and urged his followers to fight this enemy, irrespective of natural and territorial 
boundaries.88 The jihadist focus thus shifted from the near enemy to the far enemy, and 
supporters of the global jihad started carrying out attacks in the West as well as on 
foreign interests in the Muslim world.  
Bin Laden specifically framed the image of the current enemy as “the Jews and 
the Crusaders” (al-yahd wa l-albiyyn), pointing to the Christian U.S., and to Israel. 
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However, al-Qaeda’s vision of the enemy is based on a wider and, notably, historic 
interpretation. The term “Crusaders” points to early invasions of Muslim land, and 
identifies any party that is perceived as invading Dr al-’Islm. For example, Bin Laden 
has made parallels between the American intervention in the Gulf War and the Mongol 
invasion of Iraq in the 13th century.89 This historical interpretation of the term 
“Crusaders” suggests that the jihadists frame the image of their enemies independent of 
geography, values or religion: Other states, also non-Western, may qualify as enemies if 
they choose to invade Dr al-’Islm. In the current global jihad, however, the jihadists 
have specifically pointed out the West as their main enemy. Moreover, Israel (“the 
Jews”) is not necessarily a direct target, as it is for instance for the Palestinian group 
ams (Hamas), but is rather seen as the United States of America’s agent in the Middle 
East.  
Global jihadism is often mentioned in connection with salafism – a revivalist 
movement aiming to restore the authentic Islam from the time of the Prophet and to 
reestablish an Islamic state.90 While it in many cases is correct to label al-Qaeda elements 
as salafi-jihadists, one should be aware of the different components of salafism.91 Quintan 
Wiktorowicz argues that salafists share a common religious perspective, based primarily 
on the idea of tawd (“monotheism”), but that disagreement over strategy has created 
three factions of salafists. These are the “purists”, who focus on non-violent methods, the 
“politicos”, who apply the salafi creed to the political arena, and finally, the “jihadis” 
who take a militant position and encourage for violence and revolution.92 
Al-Qaeda was the vanguard and base for global jihadism, and its training camps 
in Afghanistan provided the supporters with ideological information, paramilitary 
training and personal relations. With the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, this 
organization was dissolved, and its remnants reorganized itself into a decentralized 
movement, today often referred to as al-Qaeda-inspired Islamism (radical Islamism) or 
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the global jihadist movement.93 Despite the fact that al-Qaeda no longer seems to exist as 
a conventional organization, the term ‘al-Qaeda’ will be used interchangeably with ‘the 
global jihadist movement’ in this study.94 The global jihadist movement will include the 
old cadres of al-Qaeda previously based in Afghanistan, also labeled ‘al-Qaeda Central’, 
regional al-Qaeda affiliated groups, and individuals adhering to the global jihadist 
ideology (called ‘jihadists’ or ‘mujahideen’). 
 
The ’Umma 
The Arabic word ’umma signifies people, community or nation. In modern times 
it is commonly used to mean the nation of Islamic states, or the community of believers, 
denoting the whole Muslim world. The Quran reveals a chronological development of the 
sense of the word, from a generic application, to religious communities, and, finally, to a 
more inclusive meaning of humanity in its potential toward becoming Muslim.95 As a 
politico-social order, the ’umma came into being in Medina after Prophet Mohammad’s 
hijra (“migration”) from Mecca in 622. Mohammad and his Meccan followers formed a 
political agreement and a formal group with the clans of Medina, which was called the 
’umma. This ’umma resembled earlier Middle Eastern forms of society, but differed in 
one crucial respect: it merged political and religious communal organization.96 This has 
characterized later Islamic states, based on sharia (shara), the Islamic law. The jihadists 
frequently refer to the concept of the ’umma, and use the term to denote the totality of 
Muslims, promoting a sort of pan-Islamic nationalism.97  
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Media, old vs. new 
The word medium (pl. media), may be described as “an intervening substance 
through which something else is transmitted or carried on”,98 or “a channel or means of 
communication”.99 A medium is thus a carrier of information. It provides organized 
means of transmission or storage of information, such as fact, opinion, entertainment, et 
cetera. 
In modern times, media is generally perceived as a truncation of the term media 
of communication. A medium of communication comes between the source and the 
intended audience, and communication can be a one-way process (broadcast), or a two-
way process (interpersonal and interactive).100 The term mass media is used to denote the 
section of the media specifically designed to reach a very large audience. It was coined in 
the 1920s, with the advent of nationwide radio networks, mass-circulation newspapers 
and magazines. During the 20th century, the growth of mass media was driven by new 
technology, and in the last part of the century, specifically by the Internet and the World 
Wide Web.101  
The distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ media is not always precise. The 
adjective ‘new’ carries many meanings, and may point to various aspects of 
communication based on modern technology, for instance its alleged democratic, or 
individual character, or its ability to transform social relationships.102 Some of these 
aspects may be observed in the online jihadist media campaign. However, the following 
definitions are rather based on a technological perspective: ‘new media’ will denote all 
forms of media enabled by digital technology, such as web sites, email, CD/DVD, and 
interactive television. ‘Old’ or ‘traditional’ media, on the other hand, are the traditional 
means of communication and expression that existed before the new media, specifically 
the printed press, radio and TV. ‘Mainstream media’ will be employed in the meaning of 
media sources other than ‘jihadist-controlled media’. 
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Strategy 
A strategy is a long term plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal. 
Originally from the Greek strategia, meaning generalship, it was confined to military 
matters. 103 Today, however, the word is commonly used in many disparate fields. There 
still seems to be a common perception that strategy is an idea that creates a course of 
action, following a hypothesis implying that a certain future position offers an advantage 
for acquiring some designated gain. The description of the idea is generally prepared in 
prescriptive documentation. Borrowing from IR game theory, a strategy is furthermore a 
plan for dealing with every possible move from every player(s) in the game.104 
Accordingly, in this study, a jihadist online media strategy denotes a documented 
plan for the use of the Internet, aiming at an advantageous position in the future (for the 
jihadists), also taking into account methods for countering the enemy’s (the West and 
local governments’) media moves. 
 
 
II. Jihadist Media Strategy in Theory 
 
 
Frequent media appearances, both before and after 9/11, indicate that “the 
organization [al-Qaeda] has operated according to a deliberate and calculated media 
strategy”.105 The existence of such a jihadist media strategy, including a strategy for the 
use of the Internet, is one of the main assumptions of this study. In order to reveal a 
possible strategy, the following chapter presents al-Qaeda’s official statements, 
theoretical texts and correspondence that deal with the use of media. 
The selection of texts is prepared according to the technique of relevance 
sampling. The author has searched through a large amount of mostly textual material 
thought to contain pertinent information, and presents the “population of relevant texts”. 
The texts are deemed relevant or important based on content, but also on the authors’ 
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authority (the al-Qaeda leadership and prominent strategists) and on supporters’ and 
analysts’ interest in the text (as seen for example in online readers’ assessments). 
Categories of strategic texts presented in this study include selections from the al-Qaeda 
leadership, from prominent jihadist strategists, and from the jihadist media 
establishments. 
There is a risk that the sample has failed to incorporate important works about the 
use of media. However, it includes relevant texts that circulate on the jihadist web today, 
and seeks to include relevant articles from earlier jihadist publications. In fact, central 
jihadist documents are known to be repeatedly re-published on the web forums, and it 
seems that without such wide distribution they will only have limited impact on the 
movement. Therefore, as this study includes documents from the most active jihadist web 
forums, it arguably provides sufficient information in order to present main jihadist ideas 
about the use of media.   
 
1. The al-Qaeda leadership 
Previous studies have stressed that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are 
“a leadership duo that is both media-savvy and productive”.106  Even if their media 
appearances attract wide-spread attention, among their texts that are available to the 
public few focus on how they use the media. Taking into account that the West and the 
general public are the intended audience of many of their speeches, it is perhaps quite 
natural that they do not disclose their strategies there. Nevertheless, a close reading of 
their official statements and other publications reveals certain strategic thoughts about the 
use of the media on their behalf.107 
 
Osama bin Laden 
A recurring topic in Osama bin Laden’s speeches is the role of Western media, or 
more precisely how the Americans exploit their advantageous media position, rely on 
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psychological warfare, produce deceptive lies about the mujahideen, and drowse the 
community by keeping people occupied with minor matters. On the other hand, bin 
Laden states that the Western media is not just harmful to the jihadists, it also terrorizes 
its own people by speculating and spreading propaganda about al-Qaeda, adding fear and 
helplessness to the psyche of the people of Europe and the United States: “What the 
enemies of the U.S. cannot do, its media is doing”.108 
Bin Laden has offered advice on how the jihadists themselves can use the media. 
In his “Offer of armistice with Europe” published April 14, 2004, he “ask[s] honest 
people, especially ulam’ (“Islamic scholars”), preachers and merchants to form a 
permanent committee to enlighten the European peoples of the justice of our cause [...] 
they can make use of the huge potential of the media”.109 
Bin Laden sees the potential of the media in the fact that “it enters every home” 
and “touches the entire public” due to the communication revolution.110 This is 
something he was aware of long before 9/11. When asked by CNN journalist Peter Arnett 
in March 1997 about his future plans, bin Laden responded: “You’ll see them and hear 
about them in the media, God willing”.111 However, renouncing from using the media for 
protracted periods of time also seems to be a bin Laden strategy: “our silence is our real 
propaganda”.112 The latter appears to have been bin Laden’s main strategy over the last 
year.113 
 
Ayman al-Zawahiri 
Ayman al-Zawahiri generally conveys the same ideas about Western and 
“apostate” media as bin Laden. Furthermore, al-Zawahri treats in particular the effects 
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that negative media campaigns have on the global jihadist movement. He draws his ideas 
from his experience with Jamat al-jihd (“Egyptian Islamic Jihad”, EIJ) during the 
1980’s and 90’s. In his book “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”, he illustrates his 
view on negative media influence with the story of the unintentional killing of the child 
Shaym’ during an unsuccessful attack on the Egyptian Prime Minister if iddq.114 
The Egyptian government subsequently launched a media campaign in which it claimed 
that Shaym’ was the target of the EIJ attack. According to al-Zawahiri, this led to a 
significant decline in public support for the group. Analysts have labeled this the 
“Shayma-effect”115, and for al-Zawahiri it seems to have been epoch-making evidence of 
the importance of public opinion. 
The focus on public opinion appears again in al-Zawahiri’s letter to Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi (’Ab Muab al-Zarqw), the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.116 
Reproaching al-Zarqawi’s brutal beheading scenes spread across the World Wide Web, 
al-Zawahiri states: “the general opinion of our supporters does not understand that [it is 
justified], and this general opinion falls under the malicious, perfidious, and fallacious 
campaign by the deceptive and fabricated media.”117 
Returning to his book “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”, al-Zawahiri 
suggests that “the jihad movement must dedicate one of its wings to work with the 
masses”.118 In concluding, al-Zawahiri offers advice to the future generation of the 
jihadist movement: “We must get our message across to the masses of the nation and 
break the media siege imposed on the jihad movement”. 
 
None of the two leaders of al-Qaeda has to this author’s knowledge proposed any 
strategies about the use of online media in publicly available statements and texts. Their 
main focus remains on the harmful effect of the Western media on the jihadist movement 
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– yet also its sometimes unintentional support to the movement through coverage that 
intimidates the Western public. 
 
2. Jihadist strategists 
“Jihadist strategic studies” is a relatively new phenomenon within the extensive 
textual universe of the global jihadist movement.119 This genre rose as a result of the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was considered an attack on Islam by radical 
Islamists. Therefore, they may to a lesser degree have seen the need to present rationales 
for jihad, but rather directed their attention to developing a strategy for jihad. Marked by 
a secular tone and applying Western terminology and academic sources, jihadist strategic 
literature takes an analytical and empirical approach to how to wage jihad. 
 
’Ab Muab al-Sr  
In his “Call to Global Islamic Resistance”, published online in January 2005, 
ideologue Muafa bin Abd al-Qdir Sitt Maryam Nir, better known as Umar Abd al-
akm or ’Ab Muab al-Sr, provided the global jihadist movement with what appears 
to be a unique and substantial strategic template.120 The 1600 page-long treatise offers a 
detailed analysis of the movement’s past, present and future.121 
One of the chapters is entitled “The Theory of Media and Incitement in the Call to 
Global Islamic Resistance”, or “Public Information and Advocacy for the Global Islamic 
Resistance Movement”.122 What al-Sr labels “the advocacy drive” is a four-level 
strategy including the following elements: Audience, Content of Message, Style of 
Message and Delivery System of Message. Based on these four components, al-Sr 
analyses the media campaign of the jihadist movement. He states that, in the past, the 
advocacy drive failed because of four deficiencies. One, the target audience was only the 
elite segment. Two, the content of message treated the question of governance. Three, the 
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style of message was egoistical, uncompromising, threatening, impassionate and non-
appealing to the masses. Finally, the delivery system of message was through clandestine 
written ways. 
However, developments on the jihadist media front during the Bosnian and 
Chechen wars [1992-95, and 1994-96 and 1999-present], particularly with the use of 
Compact Discs, video tapes and the Internet, turned that campaign into a huge success, 
claims al-Sr. He furthermore cites four other reasons for this media success. One, it 
targeted the ’umma at large. Two, the message focused on the obligation to join the jihad 
in order to prevent foreign aggression – an idea religiously deep seated within the public 
and comprehensible to them. Three, the style was passionate and inspiring, including 
promise of victory and rewards. Four, the delivery system included publications and 
magazines, and electronic media. 
Based on these historical examples and the lessons learned from them, al-Sr 
presents a set of recommendations for today’s jihadist advocacy drive. First, it must 
target the ’umma in its entirety, also foreign language (non-Arabic) speakers. 
Additionally, opponents of the movement must be targeted with “threatening messages”. 
Second, the content of message must focus on the injustice committed against the ’umma 
through history, from the Prophet’s life to “modern day conspiracies against the Islamic 
world”. It should also emphasize achievements in preserving the Islamic faith, such as 
narratives of resistance and martyrdom. Furthermore, the message should be educational 
and disseminate information about military science and warfare through training manuals 
and personal battlefield experiences. The content in the message should also include 
Quranic textual material and fatwas for religious legitimacy. Third, the style of the 
message must be tailored to different audiences, and reflect the levels of awareness, 
culture and education of the public. Fourth, the delivery system of the message must 
combine modern and popular means of communication. The foremost of these are the 
Internet and satellite TV, and al-Sr stresses the utilization and manipulation of 
computer capabilities and mass transmission over the World Wide Web. However, he 
does not dismiss the role of printed material, the mosques and oral transmission, in order 
to reach the segment of the population that does not have access to, or are incapable of 
using, modern technology. 
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Another interesting component of the advocacy drive is the establishment of 
“Incitement and Media Brigades”. Al-Sr recommends that “those qualified [technically, 
linguistically and religiously] for such a mission undertake the formation of cells for 
advocating and disposing for jihad, and facilitate the enterprise of jihad by providing 
comprehensive information and guidance”. The Media Brigades are responsible for the 
achievement of the jihadist advocacy drive as outlined in the above. 
It is important to bear in mind that the use of media is only one element of a 
comprehensive jihadist strategy discussed by al-Sr. Nevertheless, on several occasions 
in his treatise, al-Sr reveals a general perception that Western counterterrorism efforts 
include an aggressive media war aimed at slandering the image of the jihadists, and states 
that jihadist propagandists engaging in similar activities against the West will play the 
crucial role in breeding the Global Islamic Resistance. 
To conclude, al-Sr’s media strategy seems to focus on influencing the public 
opinion, offering detailed advice on the four components audience, content, style, and 
means of delivery of message. It is conceivably the most comprehensive media strategy 
for the global jihadist movement available. 
 
’Ab Ubayd al-Qurash 
Al-Sr’s ideas have sometimes been interpreted as a development of al-Qaeda 
strategist Ab Ubayd al-Qurash’s work.123 In an article published in the jihadist 
magazine al-’Ansr in 2002, al-Qurash positioned the global jihadist movement within 
the framework of 4th generation warfare (4GW).124 The theory of 4GW was developed by 
American Colonel William S. Lind, and appeared in an article in the Marine Corps 
Gazette in 1989 entitled “The changing face of war: into the fourth generation”.125 Lind 
defines 4GW as nonlinear, geographically dispersed warfare, involving non-
national/transnational entities such as religion or ideology. Moreover, it rests upon new 
technology, and includes a sophisticated form of psychological warfare through 
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manipulation of media.126 Al-Qurash claims that the 4GW is upon us, with al-Qaeda’s 
demonstration of “superiority of the militarily weaker side” and “defeat of nations by 
stateless opponents”. 
Regarding the use of media, al-Qurash cites Lind and other Western strategists: 
“Television news broadcasts may become more damaging weapons than armored 
brigades”, “psychological influence [...] will seek to destroy support for the fighters 
among the enemy’s own people”, and “ influence over the media and other information 
networks [...] manipulates public opinion”. However, claims al-Qurash, the media is the 
front where America holds an advantage in today’s 4GW. Therefore, he calls upon the 
jihadist movement to give extra attention to the media and to produce serious and 
targeted communication in order to break the American media blockade and regain the 
positive effect of the movement’s “heroic actions in creating sympathy and support in the 
Islamic world”. 
Al-Qurash’s media strategy emphasizes the influence on public opinion, 
hereunder both the enemy and the supporter public. He does not give specific details as to 
how to influence the public opinion, but his media strategy nevertheless seems to 
represent a noteworthy contribution in the category of jihadist strategic studies, as it 
exclusively employs Western theories and sources for supporting its arguments. 
 
’Ab Bakr Nj 
’Ab Bakr Nj127 is the pen name of the author of the online book “Management 
of barbarism”, published on the web by the al-Qaeda affiliated “Center for Islamic 
Studies and Research”.128 Nj, described as a so-called rising star in the jihadist 
movement, outlines the “grand strategy for defeating the U.S.” based on Western studies 
on management and military and political theory as well as the history of the jihadist 
experience.129 He states, much like al-Sr, that the jihadists have been unsuccessful in 
the past because of the role of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United 
States of America, and particularly because of the latter’s media campaign which has 
                                                 
126
 Ibid. 
127
 A well-known pen-jihadist from his articles with the magazine “ 
78” (“The Voice of the Jihad”). 
128
 ’Ab Bakr Nj, “9


” (“Management of barbarism”), Center for Islamic Studies and Research, 
via www.tawhed.ws/c?i=62 (accessed 10 January 2007). Original version and English translation also 
available from the Combating Terrorism Center: www.ctc.usma.edu/Management_of_Savagery.pdf 
(accessed June 2007). 
129
 Brachman, Jarret M., and William McCants, “Stealing al-Qaeda’s Playbook”. 
 40 
convinced the masses of the U.S. invincibility. However, according to Nj, with the one 
remaining superpower engaged in occupations in the Islamic world, the jihadists now 
face a great propaganda victory. He acknowledges the unlikeliness of defeating the U.S. 
militarily, but claims that a clash is important for communication victories in the short 
term (and for the political defeat of the U.S. in the long term). 
“Management of barbarism” refers to the period of chaos after the collapse of a 
state, for instance as a result of jihadist operations, and Nj offers advice on how to 
exploit and control such a situation. His “path of empowerment” guides the jihadists 
through the required steps. A first goal is to destroy the authority of America and spread 
confidence in the souls of the Muslims, by “revealing the deceptive media to be a power 
without force”.130 According to Nj, the enemy is weak with regard to battle and 
balances this with the use of gadgets, including a deceptive “media halo”. It is therefore, 
he claims, imperative to understand the media policies of the adversary in order to win 
the military and political battle. 
Nj’s plan seems to include both a military and a media strategy, the latter 
targeting the masses with the goal that they join the jihad, offer positive support and 
negative attitude towards the enemy. The media strategy also targets enemy troops with 
lower salaries with the purpose of them leaving their service, and aims to recruit officers 
of Muslim armies to the ranks of the mujahideen. A media plan which seeks to justify 
jihadist operations must be established, Nj argues, especially towards the masses. Nj 
focus on the masses seems to dominate his media strategy, as “the masses will be our 
back and support in the future”. Another target audience for the media is the “evil 
sheikhs”, who question the jihadist cause and must therefore be refuted. 
Nj gives detailed examples of how a media plan should complement a militant 
operation: An announcement given in connection with a hostage-taking operating 
multiplies the attention it draws, and a statement prior to an attack on oil facilities will 
perhaps increase the oil price alone (supporting the income of the Muslim people). 
These examples apply mostly to traditional media and are based on the idea that 
sensational operations draw attention of world media and opinion. Nj does not 
specifically treat the use of new media in his communication strategy, but does refer to, 
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and encourages, the use of the Internet. For instance, he suggests reference sources for 
doctrinal and military tactics which are all available online.131 
In conclusion, it seems that Nj’s media strategy focuses on defeating 
government and Western control over information delivery. It acknowledges the 
important role of public opinion and stresses that the masses are the main target of the 
jihadist media campaign: the campaign must justify the jihad in order for the masses to 
support the global jhadist movement. 
 
Sayf al-Adl 
Sayf al-Adl is a former colonel in the Egyptian Special Forces who joined the 
jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and became a military adviser to al-Qaeda there. 
He has published extensively in the jihadist magazines Sawt al-Jihd and al-Battr, 
particularly on security and communications. Sayf al-Adl is currently believed to be in 
house arrest in Iran.132 
One article that appeared in al-Battr issue no 7 was entitled “Information and 
Counter-activities”.133 It is a text book-style article explaining the concept of public 
opinion and how to exploit it for the benefit of the jihadists. It informs the reader about 
the “character of public opinion” in different societies, how to measure public opinion, 
and, most importantly, it presents ways to influence public opinion. These include 
repetition of an issue in different media outlets; presentation of facts, as opposed to fake 
rumors in society; diverting the attention of the masses to a topic they not yet knew of; 
and arousing emotions in the audience in order to win sympathy – however only by 
sticking to the truth. The article is another illustration of the apparent importance the 
global jihadist strategists give to the opinion of the masses. 
More recently, Sayf al-Adl has been in the limelight due to the text “al-Qaeda’s 
strategy till 2020”. In 2005, Jordanian journalist Fu’d usayn authored a book entitled 
Al-Zarqw – al-jl al-thn l l-Qida (“Al-Zarqawi: al-Qaeda’s second generation”), in 
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which he synthesized the views of several al-Qaeda leaders and presented them in a seven 
phase strategy for the development of the global jihadist movement in the two first 
decades of 21st century.134 On the jihadist web forums, where the strategy seems to be 
highly popular, the “2020 strategy” document has been attributed to Sayf al-Adl. While it 
treats the media rather briefly, it is worth noting that its second phase, the “Eye-opener 
stage” (maralat fat al-uyn), aims at informing both supporters and adversaries. Here 
it is argued that, through the Internet, electronic jihad should be carried out to propagate 
al-Qaeda’s ideas, and open the eyes of the Islamic ’umma for it to see the truth about the 
United States of America. Iraq is designated as the epicenter for the jihad in this second 
phase, running from 2003 till 2006. In retrospect, it appears that Iraq has been the main 
theater of the jihad in this period, and the source of an intensive jihadist online media 
campaign. However, Sayf al-Adl’s second phase exceeds the timeframe of 2006. 
Comments have also been made to whether this “strategy” is really a strategy: published 
in 2005, the first phases are rather observations of the present. Nevertheless, one can 
argue that Sayf al-Adl’s alleged signature on the text and the widespread attention it 
received on the jihadist web makes it an important and influential piece. 
 
’Ab udhayfa’s letter to ’Ab Abd ’Allh 
In June 2000, an unknown, presumably Saudi, jihadist under the name ’Ab 
udhayfa sent a letter to his mentor bin Laden (also known as ’Ab Abd ’Allh) and 
presented his views on the leadership skills and tactics required for Al-Qaeda to achieve 
victory.135 Emphasis was given to political and military methods as well as public 
relations strategies and information management techniques. 
’Ab udhayfa begins the letter with a critique of previous media campaigns, or 
more specifically the lack of well-coordinated campaigns. He comments on jihadist 
operations in Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya and Afghanistan, which he claims generally 
lacked a PR aspect. “People resorted to Western foreign media to quench their thirst for 
the true news”. The author sees a potential for utilizing these past events for publicity 
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purposes, for example by publishing biographies of the martyrs. However, the media 
should be up-to-date and cover events as they occur. As soon as possible after an attack, 
he argues, the movement should also take responsibility in public, in order to “affirm the 
movement’s credibility to the people”. 
’Ab udhayfa also focuses on psychological and emotional effects of jihadist 
media, suggesting that the informational apparatus should emphasize martyrdom 
operations. Published recordings of martyrdom wills and operations are thought to arouse 
the nation and rally mujahideen to join the movement. ’Ab udhayfa explicitly links this 
practice to the Palestinian organization Hamas and encourages the jihadists to imitate 
it.136 
On an organizational level, ’Ab udhayfa stresses that the information work 
must be carried out by individuals within the regular cadre of the movement, bound by 
commitment and a contract, and not only by volunteers. The information section, “the 
link between the movement and the Muslim masses”, must be separated organizationally 
from the political section. Yet, political and informational functions are combined, both 
linked to the military function, and “all acting together harmoniously to serve the 
ancestral jihad plan”. 
’Ab udhayfa offers details with regard to means of communication, 
concentrating on new media. He suggests using e-mail and points to how large website 
locations can be used to store files on the Internet. He also highlights the importance of 
establishing a website for bin Laden that collects all his written and audio-visual 
communication, and adds: “I hope that anxiety over security does not hinder progress in 
this field.” While security often is a key component of texts dealing with the use of new 
communication technology, ’Ab udhayfa rather focuses on the desire of the people to 
receive information: “People are thirsty for information and impatiently waiting for your 
[bin Laden’s] news”. 
This letter was sent to Bin Laden in 2000, and it appears that it may have had 
great influence on the media practice of al-Qaeda Central, and later on regional branches: 
The recording of martyrs’ wills started with the operation on September 11, 2001, and the 
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USS Cole attack in 2000 would have been taped had the jihadist cameraman not 
overslept.137 
 
’Ibn ’Amad al-Salm 
In 2003, At-Tibyn Publications, a jihadist online publishing house specifically 
known to translate ideological texts, issued a document entitled “39 ways to serve and 
participate in jihad”.138 Written in Riyadh by Muammad bin ’Amad al-Salm, it offers 
advice on various ways to carry out jihad. As the Saudi Arabian jihadist milieu showed 
pioneering efforts in the media jihad – despite, or perhaps because of ’Ab udhayfa’s 
critique above – it is perhaps not surprising that this text offers strategies for media 
campaigns, and incorporates the electronic jihad in particular. 
Advice number 21 (of 39) highlights the importance of distributing news about 
the mujahideen among Muslims. Allegedly, the benefits of this activity include that the 
community recognizes the unity of the movement, which provides a base of support to 
mujahideen, and sows optimism among the community. It furthermore breaks the media 
blockade of the enemies, who, al-Salm claims, have gained control of most media 
outlets. In his critique, al-Salm singles out the London-based pan-Arab daily newspaper 
al-Sharq al-’Awsa, which he urges his fellow brothers to boycott. As for the media work 
of the mujahideen, al-Salm suggests the use of traditional media, but also other means 
including web forums and online chat, electronic mailing lists, and the printing and 
distribution of news from Internet sites. 
Advice number 34 concerns “Electronic jihad”, thus treating the use of new 
communication technology more specifically. The Internet is described as a “blessed 
medium” to distribute and follow the news, defend the mujahideen by responding to false 
allegations, and publicize their ideas and goals. Al-Salm adds that the Internet offers the 
advantage of instantly reaching millions of people in seconds. He suggests an “Internet 
project”, in which designated cells use web forums to discuss jihad and republish or 
prepare articles. Media content, or “subject threads in the forum”, should include 
incitement to jihad, defense of the mujahideen, ideological consciousness-raising for 
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jihad, scholarly support and studies in Islamic law about jihad, and exposing of secular 
and heretic opponents of jihad. Al-Salm reveals a system for continuous operations of the 
“Internet project”: One cell member should post news, articles or other information every 
day while the others should comment and stimulate general participation. 
 
3. The media establishments 
The establishment of a large number of jihadist media groups – seemingly in 
accordance with recommendations from the strategists – has been followed by the 
publication of templates and outlines for the work of these groups. Habitual strategic 
goals include “breaking the Crusader control over media” and “disseminate true 
information about the global jihadist movement”. Tactics for reaching these goals have 
also been presented. Below are two examples of such texts that combine strategic thought 
and tactical advice, published by some of the largest jihadist media groups. The texts are 
recent, and highlight what seem to be new trends in the jihadist media strategy. 
 
Global Islamic Media Front and Najd al-Rw 
In August 2006, the Global Islamic Media Front published a message entitled “A 
Working Paper for a Media Invasion of America” on jihadist websites.139 The message 
was signed by Najd al-Rw, a till then unknown pen-jihadist, who nevertheless received 
great attention on the forums. 
The document presented a plan to invade the U.S. media and offered examples of 
means and methods to be used to succeed in this plan. Al-Rw emphasized the 
importance of a media war accompanying the military war. This media war should target 
and seek to influence a Western public. Al-Rw therefore explained the need for English-
proficient individuals to translate jihadist messages and to write articles and powerful 
messages. He also points to the need for people with experience from working with 
graphics, and finally for people to ensure quality control, both language- and religious-
wise, of the English material. Suggested projects include “English translations of 
statements of the Shaykhs of Jihad [...] to throw fear into the American people’s hearts”, 
                                                 
139
 Najd al-Rw, “ D&'(ECF -6B” (“A working paper for a media invasion of America”), posted 
by Global Islamic Media Front, on al-Firdaws Forum, 11 August 2006, 
www.alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=15792 (accessed 2 September 2006). The following quotes ibid, 
unless otherwise noted. 
 46 
and translations of subtitles in videos of jihadist military operations. Among the targets 
where these products are to be used, al-Rw lists American forums, American Pal Talk 
chat rooms, American newspapers and magazines, and TV stations which have websites. 
Finally, he argues that well-known American writers such as Thomas Friedman, Samuel 
P. Huntington, Francis Fukuyama and research groups such as the RAND Corporation 
should be addressed. 
The document seems rather unique due to its detailed advices on how to reach the 
West and its naming of specific persons and institutions to target. It also represents a 
seemingly growing desire among media-jihadists to reach a wider public, and to focus 
specifically on the audience in the United States of America. It seeks both intimidation of 
a mass U.S. audience, and academic discussion with the U.S. elite in order to counter 
their ideas and theories. 
 
Al-Fajr Media Center 
An article that appeared in the October 2006 issue of al-Fajr Media Center’s 
“Technical Mujahid” magazine is another recent contribution to the theoretical literature 
on media jihad.140 Written by a member of the “Information Bureau of the Islamic Army 
of Iraq”, under the pen-name al-Burq, it echoes prevailing statements about the role of 
the media, such as:  “The jihadist media in our present age has become a mainstay in the 
battle of Islam against the crusaders and the nations of unbelief”. 
The article also strengthens al-Rw’s strategy of targeting the West. “Inflicting 
psychological damage on the enemy is the primary mission of the jihadist media”, states 
al-Burq. He supports his view by referring to the tradition of the Prophet, from the 
collections of al-Tirmidh and al-Nas’: “Abd ‘Allh bin Rawha used to recite poetry 
satirizing enemies in the mosque, and was reproached by Umar bin al-Khab. The 
Prophet intervened and said: His words will be more powerful against them [the enemies] 
than a rain of arrows.”141 
Apparenty, al-Burq envisions a jihadist media strategy based on the use of 
information technology, particularly the Internet, which includes words, sound and 
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image. He also highlights the importance of film production. In order to reach the enemy, 
and especially the family of the soldiers, he suggests to create sites operating in the major 
languages of the world, in particular in English. 
Finally, al-Burq warns that the jihadists are facing a strong enemy who “has in 
his hands the weapons of technology and tremendous scientific development” – however, 
the enemy lacks the faith that guides the jihadists on their way, thereby shortening the 
technological lead of the enemy. 
 
4. Summary 
Despite the different nature of the above texts (speeches, interviews, books, 
articles, and postings on web forums) and authors (leaders, recognized strategists, and 
newcomers) the ideas concerning the role of the media that are presented seem to be 
based on a relatively similar set of assumptions. 
A common point of departure for the texts is the perception of media superiority 
of the enemy. All seem to agree that the enemy, both the West and local governments, 
effectively has used its advantageous media position against the jihadist movement. 
Nevertheless, the strategists disagree on how to deal with the media of the enemy, and 
recommendations range from boycotting local papers, to entering and using Western 
online media outlets, or to simply leaving it to terrorize its own people. 
The jihadist strategists generally agree on the fact that they have failed in their 
attempts to communicate strategically in the past. One reason for the failure is that their 
communication has reached only the elite. The masses are therefore highlighted as the 
most important audience. However, the message should be tailored to different groups in 
society, an idea that illustrates the concept of audience segmentation. Jihadists separate 
clearly between friendly and adversary audience. Friendly include both current and 
potential supporters, and adversary include fallen Muslims/apostates (near enemy) and 
the West/unbelievers (far enemy). A separation between audiences with different level of 
education is also suggested. 
Consideration of public opinion is another recurring issue in the jihadist media 
strategy. Balancing between “necessary” violent operations and negative reactions in the 
public opinion, strategists are painfully aware of the fatal consequences of having the 
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public opinion turned against the movement. They therefore recommend that the main 
concern should be given to public opinion - through mass distribution of justification of 
violent activities. Mass distribution is also expressed in more general terms: the idea that 
any issue should be advertised repeatedly in different outlets reflects the concept of 
media profusion. 
Justification, as mentioned above, is thus a major objective of the media strategy. 
Justification, or legitimization, should be based on both religious and historic evidence. 
Other goals of communication that are mentioned in, or can be derived from, the strategic 
texts in the above include education of supporters, intimidation of enemies, and 
propagation of the movement (gaining support, motivate and encourage). Indeed, al-
Sr’s entire theory about using the media is entitled the ‘incitement theory’, highlighting 
the role of propagation of the movement through media. 
While the texts outline an organizational separation between for example 
political, military and informational work, they also call for coordination of militant 
operations and communication efforts. It seems to be argued that a successful information 
campaign adds to the value of violent activities. 
Targeting the Western enemy through media is not a new idea among jihadists, 
yet more recent texts have a stronger focus on this aspect. One can argue that this is 
explained by the fact that while bin Laden and his allies a few years ago were able to 
reach the West through mainstream media, security measures now restrict such 
communication flows. Therefore, a desire to address the West has re-emerged. This is 
expressed in the suggestions to translate media material into foreign languages, and to 
influence and use Western media outlets. 
Finally, in most of the selected texts one can observe an emphasis on new media. 
Al-Sr, for example, attributed much of the recent media success of the jihadist 
movement to the use of new communication technology. While they praise and advice 
the use of Internet channels such as chat forums, Pal talk and online newspapers, few 
substantial analyses of the benefits of new versus traditional media are offered. Yet, 
timeliness of delivery of message and the large number of recipients online are 
highlighted in this respect. It is also advised to exploit the multimedia options that online 
media offers. However, as focus also is placed on the use of print media, it seems that the 
simultaneous use of new and traditional media is a preferred jihadist media strategy. 
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It is worth keeping in mind that this summary synthesizes a number of 
independent texts, produced at different times with a different public in mind. Each text 
alone presents a strategy for the use of the media, and was most likely never intended to 
be seen in relation with other such strategies. Yet, the fact that these texts all are available 
and widely distributed online opens up for the possibility that practitioners of the media 
jihad have consulted one or more of the strategies, and operate accordingly. 
The following chapters deal with the jihadist media practice. They offer an 
overview and analysis of jihadist media groups and the material they produce, which will 
possibly reveal connections between theory and practice of the jihadist media strategy. 
 
 
III. Jihadist Media in Practice 
 
1. Transitions in the Media Jihad 
1.1. From Print... 
Osama bin Laden reportedly displayed a “natural instinct for publicity”,142 and 
“even when he was a relatively young man, [he] was thinking about his media 
strategy”.143 His early thoughts about media strategies predated the launch of new 
communication technologies, and therefore mainly included printed press, radio, and 
television. 
Osama bin Laden started his militant jihadist career in Afghanistan, among the 
“Afghan Arabs” supporting the Afghan mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviet 
occupation. Abd ’Allh Azzm, bin Laden’s mentor, had established the Services Office 
(Maktab al-Khidamt) in 1984 in Peshawar, which administered the Arab mujahideen, 
and externally acted as a media office. Azzm also financed a number of the many 
Arabic language publications - in the 1990s more than 20 - that were published in the 
area. 144 
                                                 
142
 Atwan, Abdel Bari, The Secret History of al-Qaeda, London: Saqi, 2006, p.159. 
143
 Bergen, Peter, The Osama bin Laden I Know, New York: Free Press, 2006, p. 425. 
144
 Zaydn, Amad Mu’affaq, The “Afghan Arabs” Media at Jihad, Islamabad: The Pakistan Futuristics 
Foundation & Institute, 1999. 
 50 
Bin Laden supported these activities, and in 1984 started financing the magazine 
al-Jihd, a publication designed to attract money and recruits to the Afghan cause. In 
order to spread the cause further, he also invited mainstream journalists to Afghanistan to 
document his battles against the Soviets. During the end of the 1980s, Egyptian 
filmmaker ’Issm Dirz started shooting a documentary about bin Laden and his 
movement, which resulted in three released films. A biographer, mid Mr, also 
followed bin Laden during the 80’s, but has yet to publish his biography. 
Bin Laden also assisted in establishing a media office in London in 1994, called 
the Advice and Reform Committee (ARC). The office was led by Khlid al-Fawwz, and 
published and distributed bin Laden’s statements and letters between 1994 and 1998. It 
allegedly also served as a vehicle for messages between various al-Qaeda cells, and 
facilitated interviews with bin Laden for a number of international media outlets. 145 
Bin Laden gave his first interview to a representative of the Western press, Robert 
Fisk from the British newspaper the Independent, in 1993. His first interview to a global 
TV network was given to CNN in March 1997. At the time, bin Laden allegedly chose 
CNN over BBC and CBS’s 60 minutes show, because of the larger audience CNN would 
reach.146 In 1999, bin Laden gave his first television interview in Arabic to the satellite 
channel al-Jazeera (al-Jazra). 
By the end of 1999, bin Laden stopped giving interviews and his communications 
were instead recorded by the media committee of al-Qaeda, incidentally headed by a 
jihadist with the catchy nom-de-guerre ’Ab Reuter. Tapes were then given to Arab 
media for further distribution.147 The main reason for bin Laden’s halt in media 
appearances was allegedly due to Taliban’s, bin Laden’s host in Afghanistan, concern 
with his careless handling of the media. Reportedly, Bin Laden gave press conferences 
from camps in Afghanistan that the Taliban had had denied existed.148 This resulted in 
great embarrassment for the Taliban, who subsequently confiscated all bin Laden’s 
means of communication, including his satellite phones.149 However, bin Laden seems to 
have been reluctant to give up the media limelight, and ’Ab Muab al-Sr, strategist 
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and former media adviser to Bin Laden, reproached him for jeopardizing their safe haven 
by disobeying the Taliban: “I think our brother [bin Laden] has caught the disease of 
[television] screens, flashes, fans and applause”.150 
Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda movement were also very well aware of the effects of 
‘events as communication’, and planned operations with the objective of receiving 
maximum mainstream media attention. Allegedly, one of the reasons that the U.S. 
embassy in Kenya was targeted in 1998, for example, was the idea that taking the life of 
the female American ambassador would generate more publicity than that of a male.151 
As for the 9/11 events, bin Laden reportedly described them as a set of communications:  
“These young men... said in deeds, in New York and Washington, speeches that 
overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere in the world. The speeches are 
understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs - even by the Chinese. It is above all what the 
media said”.152 
However, the jihadists have expressed skepticism and mistrust towards the mainstream 
media, accusing them of manipulating the jihadist message.153  
 
1.2. ...to Online 
Already while the jihadists relied mainly on mainstream media, new technologies 
had entered the communication sphere. Despite initial debate during the 1980s about 
whether it was consistent with Islamism to use any kind of technology of Western origin 
or not, the movement soon came to embrace the Internet and the World Wide Web. Abd 
’Allh Azzm was reportedly a fierce advocate of the use of new electronic technology, 
and encouraged his followers, among them bin Laden, to exploit the potential of this 
evolving medium.154 
By 1995, radical Islamist groups had started using email lists to disseminate 
information. Simultaneously, designated jihadist media groups started to operate on the 
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web. The term ‘media group’ describes entities that present themselves as producers, 
reproducers and distributors of jihadist material. These groups can be affiliated with a 
specific group or with groups in a specific country, or only loosely associated with the 
global jihadist movement in general. Many stand out as highly productive, spreading 
news and other communications to and from geographically scattered cells of the 
movement and, just as importantly, to the grand public. 
The oldest online jihadist media group is probably the Islamic Media Center 
(IMC). Allegedly founded already in 1991, it produced online material “in a time when 
the Internet was a new thing”.155 The IMC was known to distribute training manuals, and 
it also produced films. Since 2005, however, the IMC has been inactive. The websites 
‘alneda.com’ and ‘maalemaljihad.com’ are other vanguards of the online media jihad.156 
Another example of an early online media group includes Azzm Publications. 
Azzm Publications, named after the Palestinian Abd ’Allh Azzm, operated since late 
1996 through a website (www.azzam.com) and a post office box in London. It described 
itself as “an independent media organization providing authentic news and information 
about Jihad and the Foreign Mujahideen everywhere [...] based entirely on the 
Internet”.157 Azzm Publications offered news, articles, videos and photos on its website, 
and financed the business through the sales of books and cassettes. Much of the material 
focused on Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan, the most important jihadi fronts at the 
time. Indeed, the Chechen jihadi site ‘www.qoqaz.net’ was allegedly linked to Azzm 
Publications.158 While the latter site still exists (although under a new URL), the Azzm 
website was shut down shortly after 9/11 2001, and only old Azzm publications now 
circulate on the web. 
At-Tibyn Publications has existed at least since 2001, and has operated on a 
number of websites.159 The publishing house is specialized in translation and subtitling of 
ideological works of al-Qaeda, and presents figures such as Abd ’Allh Azzm, amd 
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bin Uql’ al-Shuayb, ’Ab Muammad al-Maqdis, and Nir al-Fad. Currently, at-
Tibyn seems to be inactive as the at-Tibyn publications circulating on the web observed 
by this author are dated no later than early 2006. There exists, however, a web forum 
called at-Tibyn and a blog called at-Tibyn Publications.160 It is not known whether 
these sites are official at-Tibyn Publications sites: the blog has been inactive since 
February 2006 and the discussion forum is closed for registration.161 One should, 
however, be aware of the important role that at-Tibyn has played in the jihadist media 
campaign in the past, and continue to play through its previous publications which are 
still available online.162 
A more recent and perhaps better known representative of the jihadist online 
media campaign is the late al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. With his 
video-taped and Internet-distributed scenes of hostage beheadings, he made the media 
jihad notorious across the world. Such brutal, yet relatively sophisticated, jihadist online 
media campaigns did not end with al-Zarqawi. On the contrary, the media jihad seems to 
be a business on the rise – a fact illustrated by the establishment of a large number of new 
online media groups during the last few years. Some of these currently active groups will 
be dealt with in depth in case studies presented in the below. 
It is worth noting that the emergence of such Internet-based media groups marked 
not only a shift from print to online, but also to a large extent appears to have facilitated 
the move from the use of mainstream (Western and local) media to media outlets 
operating in the name of al-Qaeda and the global jihadist movement. While al-Qaeda also 
in the past exercised ownership and control over information through publication of 
printed magazines and newspapers, they did not to the same extent control information 
about the movement that was spread to a wider audience. The Internet seems to have 
opened for media groups to operate more independently, and to cover broader and reach 
wider. Online jihadist-controlled media channels have thus emerged as a crucial 
supplement to mainstream mass media. 
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1.3. ... and Beyond 
While the online scene currently seems to be the main theatre for the jihadist 
media campaign, and new jihadist media companies continue to emerge on the Internet, 
other developments in the media jihad have become visible with time. They point to a 
slightly different use of the Internet, as well as to a use of other channels of 
communication. 
 
The use of non-jihadist controlled media outlets 
First of all, the use of other than jihadist-controlled online media outlets is 
increasingly common. In what is perhaps an attempt to reach a wider audience, jihadists 
have started to employ Western online outlets that exercise little control over content. 
User-generated blogs and video sharing sites, such as YouTube (www.youtube.com) and 
LiveLeak (www.liveleak.com), now contain a large collection of jihadist videos. These 
videos are mainly from Iraq, but numerous recordings from other al-Qaeda fronts are also 
available. Moreover, one can observe productions from the main jihadist media 
companies, such as as-Sab and Global Islamic Media Front, though the companies 
appear to not distribute the films themselves. Instead, individuals who support the 
movement seemingly post the videos, which are often followed by hostile discussions 
between users online.163 Jihadists in discussion forums have also discussed the possibility 
of entering pro-jihadist information on American chat rooms or on Wikipedia, yet it is 
unknown whether this has actually taken place.164 Nevertheless, there seems to emerge 
signs of a jihadist trend of seeking to use and influence media outlets other than those 
under their control, and in particular Western media outlets. 
 
Satellite TV and Cell phone 
Early 2007, jihadists started streaming TV broadcast online.165 While this service 
lasted only for a few months, a satellite TV station, established by jihadists in 2005, is 
still available. A TV channel, called al-Zawr’, appears as a Sunni insurgent satellite 
television station that broadcasts footage of attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. It 
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began broadcasting from Iraq, but was eventually closed down by U.S. forces. It then 
moved its broadcast to the Egyptian government-controlled satellite network NileSat, 
where it remained until technical problems forced it to move again in February 2007. 
Subsequently, French Eutelsat Communications hosted al-Zawr’, before Western 
pressure forced it to move to the Dubai-based network Arabsat. Arabsat is owned by 22 
countries of the Arab League, with Saudi Arabia as the principal shareholder. al-Zawr’ 
is owned and run by Mishn al-Jabr, an exiled member of Iraq’s Parliament currently 
based in Syria. The videos aired on al-Zawr’, also known as Muj-TV, are allegedly 
taken from insurgent websites. Al-Jabr himself has reportedly also gone on air to 
spread his personal views of the conflict in Iraq. Lately, Al-Jabr and his al-Zawr’ have 
taken side with the anti al-Qaeda elements of the Iraqi insurgency, but continue to air 
statements, music and graphic videos of attacks on Western forces.166 
The distribution of media material through cell phone has also become 
increasingly common. Videos in the 3GP format, designed for easy use on mobile 
devices, are made available online, and some jihadist forums operate sub-forums entitled 
“mobile forum”. In addition to videos in cell phone friendly format, these contain jihadist 
cell phone wallpapers and images formatted for cell phones.167 
One can argue that the use of satellite-based TV and cell phones aims to further 
expand the audience of the jihadist media. While the satellite station is certainly 
accessible only to people with access to Arabsat, it may still reach a number of those 
without Internet access. 
 
Passive use of mainstream media 
Furthermore, the jihadists still continue to use mainstream media. They seem to 
use it not primarily to spread their ideas, for example through interviews, as before. 
Rather, it appears to serve as a source of information: News stories in Western and local 
media about jihadism, the conflict in Iraq or in Afghanistan, offer the jihadists 
information about their opponents, such as developments in counterterrorism issues, 
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Western military progress or retreat, and Western public opinion of the conflict.168 They 
may also take advantage of mainstream media and general public information, such as 
timetables, information about electricity grids, et cetera, in order to identify future 
targets.169 Mainstream press sources, in addition to assessments from Western academic 
and official institutions, are observed circulating on the jihadist web.170 Private 
counterterrorism enterprises, which for example provide English translations of jihadist 
material, are also referenced in jihadist forums in the English language.171 
These are passive uses of the media, and may as such be labeled a second 
dimension of the media jihad. 
 
A physically violent media jihad 
What may be considered a third dimension, then, is the practice of physically 
targeting journalists and media workers. This aspect of the media jihad lies outside the 
main focus of this study, but merits to be mentioned as it appears to be increasing in 
scale. Attack on media personnel is a phenomenon heavily observed in Iraq, where as of 
July 2007 as many as 194 journalists and media assistants have been killed since March 
2003.172 One may argue that this is a perhaps predictable result of a violent conflict, 
however, evidence suggests that such attacks are also part of a strategy by the global 
jihadist movement. Texts issued in the name of al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as individuals on 
the discussion forums and in jihadist strategic literature, deal with al-Qaeda’s apparent 
problem with the coverage of ‘terrorism’ in mainstream media.173 What the jihadists 
perceive as misinformation, or lack of support to their cause, is criticized, and they call 
for revenge on journalists who “publish materials injurious to the cause of the 
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mujahideen”.174 From being mostly focused on Iraqi media workers, this violent strategy 
seems to have expanded to at least rhetorically target also Arabic satellite channels such 
as al-Arabiyya, al-Irqiyya and al-Jazeera, “mouthpieces of the Crusader and Jewish 
occupation”.175 In recent developments, this practice has spread to other groups, as also 
female journalists in Palestine and Afghanistan have been particular targets of 
respectively Hamas and the Taliban.176 
 
2. Restrictions with Internet-based media  
The Internet has emerged as the main vehicle for the dissemination of jihadist 
information and propaganda, and appears to have contributed significantly to an 
increasing number of jihadist media groups gaining foothold in the informational world. 
Yet, based on the above information, one can conclude that the Internet and the jihadist 
online media channels are not the only means of communication used by the jihadists. 
While one can argue over the reasons for this diversity, one candidate may be the 
limitations of the Internet as a media channel. The main restrictions with the use of the 
Internet as a media outlet seem to lie in the following three aspects: difficult Internet 
access for supporters, and jihadist and counterterrorism security measures. 
 
2.1. Difficult Internet access 
As will be observed in the below analysis of jihadist media material, supporters 
and potential supporters, and more specifically Arabic-speaking Muslims, appear as a 
main target audience for the jihadist media campaign. The majority of individuals 
belonging to this group are allegedly located in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). As a matter of fact, Internet access in this region is highly irregular, and the 
percentage of Internet users within the total population of a country varies from 15.2 in 
Morocco, to 6.6 in Saudi Arabia, and 0.1 in Iraq.177 
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The case of Iraq stands out as particularly interesting. This study will argue that 
Iraq is the source and catalyst of a significant part of the jihadist online media campaign. 
Yet, this is also the country in the MENA region with the lowest number of Internet 
users.178 It appears that the use of the Internet is not restricted by the Iraqi government, 
but rather by the state of war in the country. 179 For instance, the power supply sometimes 
only covers a few hours of electricity per day in Baghdad.180 On the other hand, the low 
number of Internet users in Iraq may be misleading, as cyber cafés are now becoming 
more common.181 
In other MENA countries, freedom of expression is often restricted, both by 
technology and legal and physical means. The region as a whole has been labeled “one of 
the most repressive Web environments in the world”.182 This, in addition to a high 
number of illiterates, seemingly undermines the role of online jihadist media. However, it 
is important to keep in mind that the majority of jihadists are recruited from educated 
strata of the society183 and therefore may have the means to circumvent such 
restrictions.184 
 
2.2. Jihadist security measures 
Due to the illegal nature of the global jihadist movement, the jihadists themselves 
have also taken measures to restrict the access to their media material. Despite an 
articulated goal for the jihadist media to reach a widest possible audience, parts of their 
production remain accessible only to individuals actively seeking it. 
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Most of the media material is distributed on jihadist discussion forums, and new 
releases are often published on the most prominent forums before reaching other sites. 
Such prominent jihadist forums are generally password protected, and while many of 
them are open for registration, others appear to require personal connections or screening 
through communication with the moderator before new members are accepted. The use 
of forums, as opposed to official websites for groups, may in itself be interpreted as a 
security measure, as forums are open to member participation and forum owners may 
disclaim responsibility for (illegal) content posted by visitors.185 
While production of jihadist media material is probably quite ‘safely’ carried out, 
distribution to the Internet remains a critical point, as it may be traced back to 
individuals. Sometimes a video production is released online weeks or months after the 
production date indicated in the opening scene. The time gap between production and 
release probably reflects the period it has taken the material to move from one place to 
another, and may indicate a certain level of cautiousness or tribulations on the way. 
Technologically sophisticated solutions for protecting material, such as 
steganography and encryption - knowledge thought to be in the possession of online 
jihadists186 - are likely not used for media material. Again, one can assume that the lack 
of such measures reflects the goal of wide distribution of the jihadist media campaign. 
 
2.3. Counterterrorism measures 
Counterterrorism officials, both in the West and the Middle East, closely monitor 
the jihadists’ steps on the Internet. This has sparked a debate about whether one should 
seek to close down jihadist websites, or rather allow them to stay online in order to gain 
insights about the movement through surveillance. This debate also pertains to the issue 
of balancing security and civil liberties.187 The body of laws, on national and 
international levels, regulates the measures that may be taken against jihadist websites, 
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and while a legal framework controls certain criminal activities on the Internet (such as 
child pornography, identity theft, credit card fraud etc.), online communicative activities 
seem to have been partially protected by the concept of ‘freedom of speech’.  
Yet, over the last years the increased awareness about terrorists’ online 
propaganda activities has led to the establishment of resolutions and statements by 
various authorities. For example, the UN Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) calls to 
“prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts”188; and the Plan of Action of 
the UN global counter terrorism strategy (A/RES/60/288), 2006, calls upon member 
states to “a- coordinate efforts at the international and regional level to counter terrorism 
in all its forms and manifestations on the Internet, [and] b- use the Internet as a tool for 
countering the spread of terrorism [...]”.189 
Despite these efforts, it has been noted that “the small number of suspects arrested 
for dissemination of propaganda may indicate the lack of legal basis and difficulty in 
investigating these types of crimes”.190 Nevertheless, recent cases in Europe indicate that 
increased action is being taken: On July 5, 2007, Younis Tsouli, also known as the online 
jihadist ’Irhb 007 (“Terrorist 007”) , was convicted for inciting to commit acts of 
terrorism,191 and on July 26, 2007, five British Muslim men were sentenced for 
downloading and sharing extremist terrorism-related material.192 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that most jihadist websites are hosted by 
Western, and especially U.S., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), that often are unaware of 
the identity of their clients and the content on their sites.193 ISPs have a legal authority to 
remove sites that violate the law or that abuse regulations stated by the ISP itself. 
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Therefore, a preferred counterterrorist security measure is arguably to notify ISPs that 
host jihadist websites, which should have “both the ability and the obligation to remove 
such sites from their servers”.194 During the summer of 2007, private counterterrorism 
initiatives carried out a ‘notification campaign’ which resulted in the disruption of a 
handful of jihadist websites.195 
 
Finally, one should be careful when crediting either counterterrorism efforts or 
jihadist security measures with the disappearance from the web of jihadist sites, which 
may perhaps not be more than “the result of a series of unrelated events like unpaid 
Internet Service Provider bills, incompetent [jihadist web-] administration, and technical 
failures.”196 
  
 
IV. Case Studies 
 
A jihadist online media group has in the above been described as an entity that 
presents itself as a media establishment and acts as a producer and/or distributor of 
written and audio-visual material on the Internet, supporting al-Qaeda’s salafi-jihadi 
ideology. The large number of such media groups can be classified according to different 
criteria: On a functional level, the distinction between producers and distributors is 
conspicuous, yet many groups belong to both categories. Another useful and less 
overlapping categorization is the separation between local and global jihadist media 
groups. The term local may sound somewhat unfit as ‘al-Qaeda’ in this study is used 
interchangeably with ‘the global jihadist movement’. Yet, there is a clear distinction 
between media groups that serve al-Qaeda Central and the whole movement, and groups 
that are affiliated with local branches of al-Qaeda. A local media group is not necessarily 
physically based in the region it serves, but its media material is focused on issues 
relevant to the local node, while at the same time supporting the al-Qaeda cause. Local 
jihadist media groups exist in the spheres of al-Qaeda’s main fronts, including 
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Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and North and East Africa. Their online presence is 
often a development of their traditional media activities, yet for some more recent groups 
it is solely Internet-based. As for global jihadist media groups, they seem mostly to have 
been conceived with and on the Internet. 
In the following, this study will present case studies from each category, 
beginning with global jihadist media companies before moving on to one of the current 
major local fronts of the media jihad, namely Iraq. 
 
1. Global Media Groups 
 
1.1. Media Producer: As-Sab 
a. Background 
Among the global media groups, As-Sab Media Production Establishment 
thrones as a popular, highly productive and authoritative institution.197 An obvious reason 
for its prominent position is that it is as the al-Qaeda leadership’ s exclusive media outlet: 
It has produced the entire collection of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri audio 
and video tapes since late 2001. As-Sab (“ the Clouds” ) also promotes other high-level 
jihadists to the public, and produces jihadist documentaries and media material on 
military operations from Afghanistan. 
As-Sab presented its first major project on the Internet in the summer of 2001. 
It was a nearly two hour long video called “ The destruction of the American Destroyer 
[USS] Cole” .198 While the video did not contain actual footage of the attack, it presented 
previously unseen recordings of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and clips from al-
Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The video was translated into English. This was 
the first al-Qaeda propaganda piece that showed signs of the relatively high technical 
sophistication, cinematic effects, unique footage, and foreign language capabilities that 
would later be the characteristics of as-Sab productions. 
There are few known facts about the operational system of as-Sab. As-Sab 
most likely operates out of Pakistan or Afghanistan, in the vicinity of the possible hide-
out of the al-Qaeda leadership. Indeed, top al-Qaeda figures seem, at least in the past, to 
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have been linked to as-Sab: Khlid Shaykh Muammad, the alleged mastermind behind 
the 9/11 and other al-Qaeda attacks, revealed in a court hearing that “ I was the Media 
Operations Director of as-Sahab [...] under Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri” .199 On another 
operational level, it is said to have several cameramen and couriers at its disposition, and 
one as-Sab tape allegedly goes through a large number of links, of persons unknown to 
each other, before it reaches its final form and destination. One assumed cameraman of 
as-Sab, interviewed by ABC News in June 2003, claimed that as-Sab uses minivans 
as mobile studios for the editing of its videos.200 Another kind of a covert studio was 
discovered by Pakistani police in a secret basement in Waziristan in 2004, containing 
equipment used for editing audio-visual material.201 It is important to bear in mind that 
the seemingly high quality of the as-Sab productions can be relatively easily obtained 
with handheld battery cameras, low-cost, commercial digital editing equipment and only 
a minimum of technical knowledge. 
Many of the tapes of the al-Qaeda leaders have been aired at least partially on the 
Qatar-based satellite TV station al-Jazeera before finding their way to the jihadist Internet 
sites. Others are released directly on the web. As-Sab currently does not operate a 
website, but relies on distribution on the jihadist web forums. Al-Jazeera has denied any 
link to as-Sab and al-Qaeda, and claims that the tapes are anonymously delivered to 
them, often at the Pakistani al-Jazeera office in Islamabad.202 The al-Jazeera bureau chief 
in Pakistan has also on a few occasions met with emissaries of al-Qaeda in order to 
receive their tapes.203 The distribution on the Internet seems to be facilitated by the al-
Fajr Media Center, which is mentioned as ‘source’  for the as-Sab material.204 
Additionally, an “ army of volunteers”  are responsible for the widest possible circulation 
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of the tapes.205 More specifically, it has been suggested that the relatively well-known 
and now arrested online jihadist Younis Tsouli, also known as ’ Irhb 007, has been 
involved in as-Sab’ s media campaign. A short-lived website, www.as-sahab.com, 
launched in November 2005 was according to fellow jihadists the creation of ’ Irhb 
007.206 
A statistical analysis of as-Sab issuances from 2002 till 2007, offered by the 
IntelCenter207, illustrates a steady growth of publications until 2005, with respectively 6, 
11, 12 and 16 issuances a year, then a sharp increase in 2006, which saw a total of 58 
distributed tapes.208 As of March 11, 2007, as-Sab had released 13 tapes, indicating a 
continuing prolific production.209 The IntelCenter categorizes the tapes into three groups: 
“ bin Laden-tapes” , “ al-Zawahiri tapes” , and “ Other as-Sab”  (including other prominent 
jihadists and operational videos). Throughout the period, “ bin Laden”  represented 16% of 
the total issuances, “ al-Zawahiri”  31%, and “ Other as-Sab”  53%. During the year of 
2006, their numbers are respectively 10%, 26% and 64 %. 
These observations essentially seem to be in accordance with the results from the 
period of research in this study: From September throughout December 2006, as-Sab 
produced 4 Ayman al-Zawahiri tapes, and 24 other as-Sab. However, no Osama bin 
Laden tapes were issued during this period, which was a trend for the first half of 2007 as 
well.210 The above numbers give al-Zawahiri 16 % and other as-Sab 84 % of the media 
share. Another, and more operational, way of categorizing the as-Sab productions for 
the period September – December 2006 is separating between the video/audio messages 
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from prominent jihadist, and the operational videos. These two categories represent 
respectively 40% and 60% of the total as-Sab media issuances. 
 
b.  Content Analysis 
In the following, a sample of as-Sab productions will be analyzed. The 
selection of tapes includes material of different character: one video speech by the 
American Adam Gadahn, one 9/11 commemoration tape, one video speech by Ayman al-
Zawahiri, and one operational video. 
 
i. A video tape entitled “ An Invitation to Islam”  was published on jihadist websites 
on September 2, 2006.211 It is a 48 minute-long tape, including a short introduction by al-
Zawahiri, and a lecture delivered by Adam Gadahn, also known as Azzm al-’ Amrk.212 
Al-Zawahiri’ s introduction, in which he presents Gadahn as a brother who has 
“ responded to this noble, divine call” , is given in Arabic, with English subtitles. 
Gadahn’ s message is in English, with Arabic subtitles. The lecture opens up with an 
invitation to all Americans and other unbelievers - specifically U.S. soldiers in Iraq and 
Afghanistan - to join Islam. Gadahn goes on to discuss the benefits of Islam over 
Judaism, Christianity and other religions, and treats extensively the ignorance of the 
unbelievers, which he argues is both willful and the result of an effort made by Western 
political and religious authorities. Gadahn also addresses the moderate Muslims, 
attacking “ interfaith dialogue”  as a misinterpretation of the Quran.  He furthermore 
preaches unification of state and religion, and the rejection of “ false Gods”  like 
governments and the UN – creators of tyranny and oppression. Gadahn’ s performance 
generally appears as a diatribe against the West, juxtaposed with an invitation combining 
enticement and fright. 
“ An Invitation to Islam”  addresses “ all Americans in particular and all Western 
people in general” . The message is presented in the English language by an American, 
possibly strengthening its appeal to Westerners. However, the speech is subtitled in 
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Arabic, making it accessible also to Arabic speakers.  It specifically addresses non-
Muslims, urging them to embrace Islam, but also calls for Muslims to join the Jihad. 
The message of Adam Gadahn is different in style than his previous messages, 
something he himself comments on in his speech: “ it will be alleged by others that this 
message represents an unusual and suspect change in tone. It will be said they used to say 
they want to slit the throats of the infidels, now they say they want to invite them to 
Islam” . Compared to Gadahn’ s previous threats of attacks (on Los Angeles and 
Melbourne in 2005213), this message does seem to mark a shift towards a slightly 
different rhetoric. In effect, one can argue that it resembles the truce offered by bin 
Laden214: Gadahn offers forgiveness to all unbelievers who repent. Also, Gadahn appears 
concerned about the fate that awaits the West, and with his “ heartfelt invitation” , Gadahn 
seems to add a personal approach to the video. He mentions his own experiences with 
Christianity and Islam, but does not embark on a sophisticated religious rhetoric. In a 
simple language, and with only a few references to and quotes from the Bible and the 
Quran, he seeks to compare the two religions. His alleged intimate knowledge of Western 
societies appears in anecdotes from his life in the United States, and in references to 
Western personalities. He also treats Western ideas, such as the “ American dream” , 
which he denounces, and the concept of “ clash of civilizations” , in which he depicts the 
Western culture as barbaric. He appears intent on shortening the gap between himself and 
his audience, while elevating himself as someone with knowledge about “ the right 
religion” , who has “ chosen the right path” . In the video, Gadahn is shown sitting in front 
of a computer and a row of Arabic books, both symbols of knowledge. His appearance in 
a white Pakistani dress, turban and long beard stands in contrast to his American accent, 
another example of Gadahn trying to combine Western characteristics with what he 
deems “ the right path”  - jihadism. 
The main strategic goal of the “ Invitation to Islam” -video seems to appear in the 
title: propagation of the movement. Thus, the video represents an approach of recruitment 
of those who are normally considered to be the enemies of the movement. 
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ii. The video entitled “ Manhattan raids: Knowledge is for acting upon”  was 
published on occasion of the fifth anniversary of 9/11.215 The 91 minute long production 
does not have one single protagonist, but presents a number of prominent al-Qaeda 
figures, and appears as an educational documentary film reviewing the grievances of the 
al-Qaeda movement. The narrator is an unnamed individual. The video begins with a 
review of the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the consequent “ expulsion of 
Palestinians from the Holy Land” , accompanied by historic footage from the 1948 war. It 
further condemns the previous presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, and the 
West’ s exploitation of the oil in the Middle East. The American invasion of “ the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan”  is heavily criticized, as well as the UN-embargo of Iraq in the 
1990s and the U.S.-led invasion and subsequent occupation in 2003. The documentary 
claims that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were planned long before the 9/11 
attacks, as part of a Zionist-Crusader plot to take over Muslim lands. These views are 
presented through old recordings of statements by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
Adam Gadahn, and Abd ’Allh Azzm and Shaykh amd bin Uql’  al-Shuayb, the 
latter offering theological justifications for al-Qaeda’ s jihad. Clips of the 9/11 hijackers’  
recitations of wills are also featured, some of which are previously unseen, such as W’ il 
al-Shihr and Hamza al-Ghamd. They point to their wrongly imprisoned brothers, in 
particular the blind Shaykh Umar Abd al-Ramn, and invoke previous successes of al-
Qaeda, such as the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack 
on USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden. Extensive footage from Manhattan at 9/11 2001 is 
aired at the end of the video, perhaps underlining the extent of success as-Sab attaches 
to the 9/11 attacks. The general message of the film is that injustices are being 
perpetrated against the ’ umma, and the duty upon Muslims is to wage jihad in response. 
The documentary film “ Manhattan Raids”  has multiple potential audiences. It 
targets potential supporters with education about the movement, and justification for its 
existence. It also incites existing supporters, pointing to the success of al-Qaeda. 
Moreover, by showing footage of the 9/11 attacks and suffering Americans and using 
Arabic narration and English subtitles, intimidation of the enemy appears as an 
underlying goal of communication of the documentary. 
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In essence, the film appears as an educational piece. One of its assets lies in the 
professionalism and technological sophistication of the film: A narrator guides the 
viewers through history, accompanied by old and new footage carefully put together. It 
teaches its viewers about the history of the Arab people, linking the suffering of Muslims 
in general, and Palestinians in particular, to the jihadist cause. Personalities with high 
symbolic value feature in the video, offering authority (bin Laden and al-Zawahiri), 
religious significance (’ Ibn Uql’  al-Shuayb), and recruitment drive (the so-called 
martyrs from 9/11). The fact that some of the footage has not been shown prior to the 
release of this video, adds to its authoritative and exclusive character. The different 
personalities mentioned in the above all emphasize different aspects of jihad: the video 
include legitimization of the movement’ s violent activities, outlining the historic rationale 
for al-Qaeda’ s fight and its religious justification, as well as a call for participation in 
jihad as a personal duty. Moreover, the eulogy of the 9/11 martyrs, in effect branding 
them as role models, and the presentation of the attacks as successes worthy of imitation, 
point to propagation as a goal of communication. 
 
iii. On December 20, 2006, as-Sab released a video with a speech by al-Zawahiri, 
entitled “ Realities of the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief” .216 Seemingly, the speech 
aims to educate the ’ umma: it presents legal and factual points of view concerning critical 
events in the Islamic world. Al-Zawahiri begins by reminding his public of the Balfour 
Declaration, which he points out as a historic starting point and example of the Crusader 
animosity to Islam. He then claims that the main goals of the jihad are the 
implementation of sharia and recovery of land which was once a land of Islam. Al-
Zawahiri launches several messages: To the ’ umma, claiming that Palestine is the cause 
of every Muslim; To the mujahideen in Afghanistan, praising their strong resistance; To 
the Democrats in the U.S., reminding them that they are considered the same as 
Republicans, and that the Mujahideen, not the Democrats were the winners of the 
midterm elections [in November 2006]; And to the American people, whom al-Zawahiri 
calls a people who has neglected the voice of morality, justice, principles and intellect. 
Subsequently, al-Zawahiri begins a discussion of the role and duties of the Muslim 
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’ umma towards the Western aggression, criticizing support of the moderate Muslim 
clerics to the Crusaders, and calling upon Muslims to use all methods of popular protest, 
like demonstrations, strikes, boycott of products against the enemies. Finally, al-Zawahiri 
sends his greetings to all fronts of the global jihad, from Chechnya and Turkey, via Iraq, 
to Algeria and Somalia. 
Al-Zawahiri’ s message is explicitly addressed to Muslims in Palestine, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Iraq, Chechnya, Somalia and Algeria in particular, and to the Muslim ’ umma in 
general. He also addresses the American people. The message is spoken in Arabic, and 
has English subtitles. A part of the video was shown on al-Jazeera. 
 “ Realities of the Conflict between Islam and Unbelief”  appears more aggressive 
than Gadahn’ s “ invitation” . Al-Zawahiri conveys his message through a structured 
speech, in which he presents enumerated points and messages to named groups. As 
promised in the introduction, Al-Zawahiri provides factual and religiously legal 
arguments in his discussion, yet his rhetoric is rather religious. Comparing the sharia, or 
“ divine law” , to international law, he quotes the Quran thirteen times, referring only six 
times to International or Western law or agreements.217 He also refers to recent events, 
such as the U.S. midterm election and the Bush-Malik meeting in Amman, both in 
November 2006, thus proving his knowledge about current affairs as well as underlining 
the recent date of recording of the video. However, al-Zawahiri also refers to historic 
events, drawing parallels between the Soviet defeat by the mujahideen in Afghanistan 
and the current situation of the Americans there. This rhetoric represents a reminder to 
the ‘umma of the ‘invincibility’  of the mujahideen: Seen in a near historic context of 
Arab military defeats, it may seek to undermine a (military) inferiority complex of 
Muslims. To both the West and the Muslim ’ umma, al-Zawahiri presents ultimatums— to 
the West: To stop attacking Islam or to come under attack; To the Muslims— to live on 
“ the margins of the new world order”  and receive due punishment on the day of 
judgement, or to join the jihadists. He reinforces his words by repeating well-known 
phrases, such as Bin Laden’ s: “ as you bomb, you will be bombed, and as you kill, you 
will be killed” . However, he praises the faithful mujahideen, and seems intent on creating 
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unity in the ’ umma – a word he repeats as many as 42 times – by addressing “ brothers”  
across the globe. 
Intimidation of the enemy stands out an apparent strategic goal of communication 
in al-Zawahiri’ s piece. Moreover, it seeks propagation by inciting supporters, and 
possibly recruiting Muslims who are not yet supporters by offering facts that arguably 
legitimize the jihadist cause. 
 
iv. The series of videos under the name “ Hellfire for Americans in Khursn 
[Afghanistan]” 218 are generally short recordings of attacks. Titles read, for example, 
“ Attack on military vehicle in Helmand” , and “ Attack on American camp” . A typical 
video is the “ Rocket attack on American base in Khst” , issued on jihadist websites in 
October 2006.219 The 3:34 minute long video is introduced with computer-generated 
graphics of rockets firing at a map-shaped and flag-colored North American continent. 
The entire video is accompanied by nashd220, and only a few exulting exclamations in 
Arabic are heard. The video has captions explaining the events on the screen. It shows 
soldiers arriving on the battlefield at night. They prepare the weapons, and finally fire 
rockets into the dark. Then the mujahideen, rejoicing, are informed through Intercom that 
the attack was successful. However, the video does not show the actual damage inflicted 
by the attack. 
The operational video consists of short clips, recorded during night, and is 
therefore of low visual quality. The value of the video, and its appeal to the public, seems 
to lie in the direct view of mujahideen activities that it offers. Showing an allegedly 
successful attack, one can argue that it presents the movement as a strong, talented and 
victorious force. Moreover, the operational video is presented with religious chanting and 
only Arabic caption, indicating a probable target group of mainly supporters of the 
movement. Its most likely goal seems to be propagation by incitement among supporters, 
and more specifically direct recruitment of new fighters. It is furthermore known that 
jihadist groups, at least in the past, have used recordings of successful attacks to prove 
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their credentials to sponsors.221 This may be another goal of the films in the series 
“ Hellfire for Americans in Khursn” .  
 
c. Summary – as-Sab 
As the above analysis indicates, as-Sab’ s observed strategic goals of 
communication include propagation, intimidation, legitimization and education. As-
Sab distinguishes itself on the global jihadist media scene particularly by two 
characteristics: it is the exclusive producer of bin Laden and al-Zawahri tapes, and it has 
a strong focus on audiovisual productions. 
First, as-Sab has become known as the official al-Qaeda media bureau, and 
seems to be the only jihadist media company with direct links to bin Laden and al-
Zawahri. It also seems to have exclusive access to recordings of other prominent 
individuals, such as the 9/11 “ martyrs” . It is also worth noting that while some jihadist 
media establishments remain focused on a local audience, as-Sab targets a wide public. 
This is evident in its meticulous work of subtitling (to English and Arabic) and in the 
global issues it often addresses. One can argue that one of the reasons for this outward-
oriented media strategy is the fact that as-Sab productions feature figures that are prone 
to receive attention outside their immediate sphere, such as the leadership of al-Qaeda 
and Adam Gadahn. It is worth noting, however, that while statements by the al-Qaeda 
leadership previously drew vast media attention, mainstream Western and Arab 
audiences seem increasingly inured to the numerous al-Zawahiri speeches: During winter 
2007, few of his released speeches seem to have received noteworthy attention in 
mainstream media. Yet, as-Sab remains a particularly popular media outlet among 
supporters: New productions are advertised in advance, and generate widespread praise 
from web forum members.222 
Second, as-Sab has chosen to focus on audio-visual productions, unlike most 
other jihadist media outlets that include - or even solely employ - written texts.223 
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Compared to other types of media, sustaining audio and video productions require 
relatively significant economic and human resources. For as-Sab, these resources seem 
to be in place, allowing the group to produce multimedia productions that employ a wide 
range of means in order to influence its audience. It remains an open question whether 
audio-visual means are more efficient than other methods, but as-Sab’ s prominent 
position on the global jihadist media scene and its remarkable continuous increase in 
activity is at least noteworthy. 
It is also worth noting that the increased productions from the as-Sab media 
campaign accompany a decline in al-Qaeda operations. According to an IntelCenter 
study, the period from 2006 to March 2007 saw the lowest number of attacks allegedly 
directed by ‘al-Qaeda Central’  since 2002.224 Speculations over whether media efforts are 
linked to operational planning, consequently making media activity an indication of 
pending violent activities, are therefore uncertain. What seems perhaps more likely, is 
that as long as no new ‘al-Qaeda Central’  attacks are carried out, the leadership relies on 
an intensified as-Sab media campaign in order to remain the center of attention of both 
supporters and opponents. 
Regarding social construction, as-Sab productions place the jihadist movement 
and its fight within the frame of ‘clash of civilization’ . The Western civilization is 
depicted as the evil force opposing the Muslim people and the ’ umma, whom as-Sab 
(or its protagonists) pretends to represent. Violent activities are therefore carried out in 
defense of the allegedly long-time suffering ’ umma, in a struggle where the mujahideen 
are presented as an invincible military force. The al-Qaeda leaders, promoted through as-
Sab, speak to U.S. and European state leaders, in effect placing themselves on the same 
level. 
Finally, the prominence of as-Sab seems to lie essentially in the characters it 
features, and its access to unique video footage, both old and new. Early on, as-Sab sat 
the standard for technological sophistication of jihadist media productions, and was for a 
while one of few quality-producers. However, it has recently been followed by a number 
of other jihadist media companies. 
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1.2. Media distributors: Al- Fajr Media Center, et. al. 
a. Background 
Al-Fajr Media Center, much like as-Sab, seems to be attributed high internal 
prestige in the jihadist milieu. It distinguishes itself from as-Sab in the sense that it is 
almost solely dedicated to distribution - and not production - of media material. In the 
following, al-Fajr and similar jihadist media distributor networks will be presented. 
Since these groups do not produce their own media material, no sample of media 
productions will be analyzed in this section. 
 
Al-Fajr Media Center began its campaign on the jihadist web early 2006 as a 
distributor of jihadist news. During its time of operation, it has expanded its scope, 
representing an increasing number of jihadist groups and distributing to an increasing 
number of websites. Operating a seemingly highly effective distribution system, it is still 
unclear exactly how al-Fajr works. Experts have suggested that “ al-Fajr is a small 
number of individuals who have organized themselves into a tight network, they trust 
each other, and they’ ve developed a really good distribution system” .225 A similar 
interpretation assesses that al-Fajr is a “ group of individuals on the Internet who have 
taken upon themselves to be responsible for distributing authentic terrorist 
propaganda” .226 The timelines and accuracy of the al-Fajr news releases indicate that 
these individuals are well-coordinated internally as well as externally with their “ clients” . 
Al-Fajr does not operate a website, but distributes news to the jhadist forums.  
Al-Fajr has nonetheless a reputation of distributing authentic material. Jihadist 
groups, such as those included in the “ Islamic State of Iraq” , rely solely on al-Fajr for 
distribution of their material, and disclaim all other sources.227 Nevertheless, al-Fajr is 
aware of the possibility of copycats, and in June 2006 it issued a statement about “ the 
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fabrications of statements in the name of al-Fajr” .228 In this statement, it listed a number 
of forums and sites designated to post authentic al-Fajr newswires. These were al-isba, 
al-’ Ikhl, al-Burq, al-Firdaws forums, and the World News Network, and The ’Ansr 
Mailing List. Since that time, the number of partners has increased. 
The jihadist groups that are represented by al-Fajr include, most notably, the 
Islamic State of Iraq (formerly the “ Mujahideen Shura Council” ), ’Ansr al-Sunna, 
Qidat al-Jihd in Afghanistan, al-Qida f ’Ar al-Ribt (Palestine), al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (formerly the Salafist Group for Call and Combat), the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group, Fat al-’ Islm in Lebanon, and some Somali jihadist groups. All these 
militant groups have media wings that produce media material, but apparently have 
outsourced the distribution job to al-Fajr. Multi-media companies also rely on al-Fajr’ s 
distribution network; These are as-Sab, Labbayk of the Taliban, and al-Furqn in Iraq. 
Furthermore, texts by prominent individuals within the movement, such as Shaykh 
Ayat ’Allh and ’Ab Yay al-Lb, are published directly by al-Fajr. 
The above list illustrates an international coverage, and includes both newcomers 
and well-established jihadists. Al-Fajr’ s efforts to incorporate new groups in the global 
jihadist media network are worth mentioning. By lending its name to new groups or 
individuals that publish on the Internet, al-Fajr also seems to increase these groups’  
prestige and proves the authenticity of their material. Somalia is an example of how al-
Fajr boosted a relatively inexperienced online media operation. One of the first online 
multimedia propaganda pieces that emerged from the jihadists in the Horn of Africa 
during the escalation of the conflict in 2006 was distributed by al-Fajr.229 The production 
appeared to be local, and was a Somali language version. What may have been added by 
al-Fajr was the Arabic title, “ Jam al-Murtaddn f l-oml” (“ Hell for Apostates in 
Somalia” ), a well-known label for al-Qaeda videos.230 Due to al-Fajr’ s wide distribution 
network, the Somali film was made accessible to a much larger audience than it 
seemingly was intended for: Al-Fajr assisted in lifting the jihad in Somalia to a global 
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level. Moreover, this jihadist video of unknown producers got its ‘stamp of authenticity’  
by al-Fajr. 
Al-Fajr has also released a small number of its own productions. These include 
most notably a publication series entitled the “ Technical Mujahid” , which is dedicated to 
information technology issues and focuses in particular on the secure use of computers 
and the Internet. 231 
 
Another distributor of jihadists media is the “ World News Network”  (WNN, 
www.w-n-n.com). Unlike most other jihadist media companies, it operates a website that 
contains what is perhaps the most comprehensive database of statements and news 
reports from global jihadist groups. The WNN started its activity during the summer of 
2005, and ran its service for a year. After a break of six months, it has now been active 
since December 2006. The website has sections for “ Latest news worldwide” , “ [Jihadist] 
statements, reports and issuances” , “ Editorials and opinions” , and an “ English section” . 
The “ Latests news”  section contains news pieces taken from online Arab and Western 
mainstream newspapers, as well as from online Islamic news sites. The sources include, 
but are not limited to, Qatar-based al-Jazeera, Lebanese an-Nahr, Jordanian al-Ra’ y, 
U.S.-based CNN Arabic, UK-based al-Quds al-Arab, as well as Italian and Dutch news 
sources, and finally websites like islamicnews.net and islamtoday.net. “ Statements, 
reports and issuances”  include information about the jihadist groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, Saudi Arabia et cetera, as well as publications from the 
media groups. The material includes official statements, films, and magazines. “ Editorials 
and opinions”  are mainly longer postings collected from the jihadist discussion forums, 
often written by senior members on the forums. Also, editorials from mainstream media 
are included. Finally, the “ English section”  presents some of the jihadist news releases in 
English, but the WNN does not provide translations beyond what is already translated by 
other media establishments or the jihadist groups themselves. It is worth noting that the 
WNN is slightly slower than other sites in presenting new releases. On the other hand, it 
is known to offer a comprehensive collection and to be a trustworthy source partly 
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because it presents official statements and commentaries from password-protected 
jihadist web forums. 
 
Another means for distributing news is mailing lists. The ’Ansr al-Bardiyya 
(“ The Supporters Mailing List” ) announces on its registration site (www.ansar-jihad.net): 
“ Don’ t be the last to know. Hurry up and join us. Receive the latest news of the jihad... 
and everything the mujahideen release” . By signing up on their mailing list, members 
receive ’Ansr al-Bardiyya’ s selected news picks. A majority of the news distributed by 
the group concerns the jihad in Iraq. Some of their messages are also distributed on the 
jihadist web forums.232 In fact, ’Ansr al-Bardiyya encourages its members to forward 
the news to the forums to help spread the jihadist message. ’Ansr al-Bardiyya is also 
known to translate jihadist media material from Arabic to Western languages, such as 
English and French. 
 
b. Summary – distributor groups 
The jihadist media distributor groups work with the objective of conveying the 
message of groups or individuals to the largest possible audience. Through various online 
means, such as websites, mailing lists or forums, they spread the jihadist news on a global 
scale. 
Al-Fajr Media Center appears as the most important distributor node. As a 
representative of some of the largest jihadist media establishments, and a mouthpiece for 
jihadist ideologues and militant groups, it seems to manage much of the global jihadist 
media campaign and acts as a support network for the global jihadist movement in media 
affairs. Al-Fajr has not added much to the campaign with regard to content – however, 
the “ Technical Mujahid”  magazine is significant, representing a new genre and seemingly 
fulfilling a perceived need among the jihadists.233 Rather than adding content, al-Fajr has 
come to hold an important role in expanding and coordinating the jihadist online media 
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campaign. Regardless of the question of al-Fajr holding direct links to ‘al-Qaeda 
Central’ , it seems to be understood as a reliable agent of the global jihadist movement. 
This is apparent in the trust that militant groups, such as the “ Islamic State of Iraq” , 
seems to place in it. Its authority seems also to lay in the fact that Al-Fajr, and other 
distributor groups, have gained access to the most important jihadi web forums on an 
administrative level, acting as “ correspondents”  (mursiln) that are approved by the 
forum administrators. 
In addition to carrying out a ‘screening and authentification process’  when 
selecting groups and news for publication, the distributors WNN and ’ Ansr al-Bardiyya 
also facilitate access to the messages: WNN’ s website acts as a relatively stable node for 
visitors, while ’Ansr al-Bardiyya provides a constant flow of jihadist news delivered 
directly to the subscriber of their service. The translation service offered by ’Ansr al-
Bardiyya furthermore expands the target audience. 
With regards to strategic goals of communication of these media distributor 
groups, one may argue that the goal of the client group, which produces the material, is 
also the goal of the distributor. In general, however, the goal of expanding and 
coordinating the global jihadist media campaign seems to stand out, an activity that may 
translate into propagation of the movement and community building. 
 
2. Local Media Front: Iraq 
 
Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraq has arguably become the most 
important battlefield of the global jihad. Insurgency groups in Iraq affiliated with al-
Qaeda have been active on the ground, and their media wings have been equally active 
distributing information on the Internet. This period has also seen the establishment of 
new Iraqi-centered media organizations operating on the web. In order to understand the 
current jihadist online media situation in Iraq, it is helpful to review events that have 
taken place since 2003 and in particular during the last year (2006). The following 
analysis of the Iraqi jihadist media scene comprises the elements linked to “ al-Qaeda in 
the Land of the two Rivers [Iraq]” , including; First a background narrative of al-
Zarqawi’ s group, arguably the starting point of the jihadist online media campaign; And 
second, background and analysis of its successors, the “ Mujahideen Shura Council”  and 
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the “ Islamic State of Iraq” . Furthermore, background and analysis of other jihadist Iraqi-
focused media establishments without group affiliation are included. Finally, a brief 
overview of the media wings of the Sunni insurgency groups in Iraq is provided. It can be 
argued that some of these groups may not necessarily form part of the global jihadist 
movement, but they are nevertheless included in the study in order to give a 
comprehensive understanding of the media jihad in Iraq. 
 
2.1. “Al-Qaeda in the Land of the two Rivers [Iraq]” 
a. Background 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of “ Group for Monotheism and Jihad”  (Jam

at al-Tawd wa l-Jihd), later “ al-Qaeda in the Land of the two Rivers [Iraq]”  (Q  idat 
al-Jihd f Bild al-Rfidayn), took the crucial step of mobilizing computer-savvy allies 
to fight against the U.S. occupation. His use of media benefited the propagation of the 
jihadist movement globally and also promoted the recruitment of foreign fighters to his 
ranks. Al-Zarqawi’ s first communiqué appeared on a jihadist web forum in April 2004, 
amidst a flurry of other audio-visual propaganda, including video clips of military 
operations and photographs of suicide attacks. In particular, al-Zarqawi gained notoriety 
for videotaping beheadings of foreign and Iraqi hostages. While this practice spread to 
other groups in Iraq, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ’Ab Muammad al-Maqdis and other leading 
figures in the global jihadist current, reprimanded al-Zarqawi for these gruesome 
practices.234 Despite this controversy, al-Zarqawi’ s media campaign was generally 
perceived as a success within the global jihadist movement. One particular reason for this 
was the attention it received in the West.
Al-Zarqawi himself appeared openly only in one video in April 2006, less than 
two months before he was killed by U.S. forces in Iraq.235 By that time, he had already 
transferred authority - and management of media - to the “ Mujahideen Shura Council” . 
 
The “ Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq”  (Majlis Shr al-Mujhidn f l-Irq) 
was formed in January 2006 and announced on the jihadist forums by the official 
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spokesman of “ al-Qaeda in Iraq” , ’Ab Maysara al-Irq. The “ Mujahideen Shura 
Council”  (MSC) was allegedly a coalition of six insurgent organizations, the most well-
known of them “ al-Qaeda in the Iraq”  led by al-Zarqawi until his death in June 2006, 
upon which ’Ab Hamza al-Muhjir took over the leadership. The other groups of the 
MSC were not well-known at the time and most likely included rather small 
organizations or armed factions.236 In its first statement the MSC declared its intention 
"to liberate Iraq from occupation, to unite and direct all mujahideen efforts and to raise 
the flag of Islam and Sunna” .237 The MSC has since its formation run a website, 
originally only in Arabic, but since March 2006 also in English.238 The sites are hosted by 
Blogspot, a free automated weblog publishing tool. This MSC blog is administered by the 
“ MSC Media Company” , which on a daily basis posts statements about military 
operations carried out by its partner groups. The site also links to newly released jihadist 
videos, ranging from amateur recordings of ambushes to technologically sophisticated 
audio-visual material. These productions are signed by both the “ MSC Media Company”  
and other media establishments. Unlike most blogs, this one is not open for comments by 
its readers; it is purely a source of jihadist information. Until mid-October 2006, the MSC 
was an important component of the Iraqi insurgency and the material from its media 
company a widely distributed jihadist source. At that point, the “ Islamic State of Iraq”  
was established and the MSC became part of an even broader coalition. 
 
On October 15, 2006, the establishment of the “ Islamic State of Iraq”  (Dawlat al-
Irq al-’ Islmiyya) was announced on jihadist forums. The announcement was published 
by the “ MSC Media Company”  and distributed on several jihadist websites and also 
accompanied by a video explaining the details of the new state.  The MSC announcement 
brought: 
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“ good news from the land of the two rivers, from the land of the Caliphs, from Baghdad, 
home to the Caliphate, may God release it from the hands of the Crusaders and the 
Shiites. And this is the fruit of the tree of monotheism - watered by the blood of the 
martyrs – and the fruit has ripened and the time of harvest is approaching [...] The faithful 
mujahideen in the land of the two rivers present to the people of Islam in every place, and 
to the people of the Sunna in Iraq in particular, the announcement of the establishment of 
the state of truth, the state of Islam, that will rule by the law of Allah over humanity and 
over the land. [...] And we ask every Muslim in the world to support this state with 
money, men and prayer” .239 
 
The announcement of the establishment of the “ Islamic State of Iraq”  (ISoI) 
caused much discussion, and a good portion of skepticism, on jihadist discussion forums 
and in particular in the Arab press.240 Part of the announcement video was aired on al-
Jazeera, whereas Western media initially paid seemingly little attention to the whole 
incident.241  However, despite initial doubt, the ISoI has proven to be a lasting concept at 
least in the virtual world. Its impact on the ground in Iraq has yet to be analyzed, but it is 
noteworthy that the period following the announcement has been very violent. 
The Islamic State of Iraq is now dominant on the weblog site that the MSC 
operated. The design of the site is identical and the content is also of the same character, 
but whereas the statements used to be signed by the “ MSC Media Company” , they are 
now signed by the “ Ministry of Information/ the official spokesman of the Islamic State 
of Iraq” .242 Moreover, a new website, Islamic Iraq (http://islamiciraq.modawanati.com), 
also in blog format and exclusively dedicated to information from the “ Ministry of 
Information of the Islamic State of Iraq” , has been established. The contributions on this 
site are posted by a certain ’Ab Qq al-Tamm, but a disclaimer states that “ this site 
is a personal effort, and not an official site of the Islamic State of Iraq” . Both this blog 
and the former MSC blog publish “ news reports”  from the different provinces of the new 
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State, including information about military operations, and official statements from the 
State on political, religious and military matters. The news reports give detailed accounts 
of the operations of the different partner groups in the “ Islamic State of Iraq” , and 
mention means, goals and results of attacks. “ Blessed martyrdom operations”  carried out 
by their members and ‘spectacular attacks’  are usually presented in separate postings. 
Religious comments are provided by the State’ s “ Sharia Court”  whose rulings have been 
published on a few occasions. It is, however, worth noting that despite having a “ Sharia 
Court” , the “ Islamic State of Iraq”  relies on religious legal opinions and fatwas from 
outside scholars. On December 18, 2006, the “ Ministry of Information”  officially blessed 
such an opinion regarding “ Jihad against the enemies” .243 Furthermore, political 
comments include focus on events in the United States, such as President Bush’ s speech 
before the mid-term elections in November 2006.244 They also keep a focus on Iraqi 
internal affairs, like the escalation of Shiite-Sunni violence.245 One can observe a military 
and organizational focus: For example, a statement threatened with revenge for 
“ crusader”  operations,246 and another announced that two paramilitary groups had sworn 
loyalty to the leader of the ISoI, ’ Ab Umar al-Baghdd.247 
 
On October 31, 2006, the formation of the “ al-Furqn Establishment for Media 
Production”  (Mu’ assasat al-Furqn l l-’ Intj al-’ Ilm) was announced on the ISoI 
website and other jihadist websites.248 Parts of the statement read: 
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“ The Ministry of Information in the Islamic State of Iraq is pleased to announce the 
formation of a media establishment that will handle audio and video dispatches, and all 
media issuances from the Ministry of Information in the Islamic State of Iraq, may Allah 
glorify and facilitate it. This establishment, with the Grace of Allah, shall be a distinct 
milestone on the distinguished course of the jihadi media, which occupies great prestige 
and conducts the struggle with the Crusaders and their followers to reveal the shame and 
falsity of the Crusader media. So await that which will please the faithful and frustrate the 
infidels and hypocrites. In the upcoming days, await our issuances in their new technical 
and informational format. We ask Allah for guidance and success and for that work to be 
for him” .249 
Al-Furqn is the name of the 25th sra of the Quran and means “ the Criterion” . The 
Criterion also refers to the Quran itself, as the decisive factor between good and evil. The 
announcement of al-Furqn Media Establishment points to this connotation: “ al-Furqn 
distinguishes between right and wrong [...] and al-Furqn separates between the one who 
fights in the name of Allah and the one who fights in the name of Despotism” . 
Interestingly, in a statement from the “ Ministry of Information”  published a week later, 
on November 6, it reminds the public that all its media issuances published on the 
Internet, both written and audio-visual, and including the issuances from al-Furqn, are 
collected from “ al-Fajr Media Center”  and the “ Ministry of Information”  disclaims all 
media material referring to the ISoI from other sources.250 
Since the announcement of the formation of al-Furqn Media Establishment, it 
has, as declared, been in charge of the audio-visual material issued by the ISoI. In 
December 2006, al-Furqn announced the start of a new series of media publications. 
The new films were to include the “ Knights of Martyrdom”  e.g. documentation of suicide 
operations, and “ The hell of Romans and Apostates in the Land of the two Rivers” , 
consisting of clips of military operations of short and medium length.251 No videos in 
these series were published in 2006, however, al-Furqn’ s productivity has risen 
noticeably in 2007.252 
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b.  Content Analysis 
The above discussion of MSC, ISoI and al-Furqn gives a general picture of the 
kinds of media issuances published from the global jihadist movement in Iraq. In the 
following, a sample of selected pieces will be presented. The pieces represent a sample 
from “ al-Qaeda in Iraq’ s”  three successive media entities, and include productions of 
different character: video productions, audio speech, written news report, and political 
and military commentaries. 
 
i. MSC operational videos are generally short clips of attacks. One example is the 
film posted October 13, 2006, entitled “ Killing of an Iraqi soldier by the Mujahideen” .253 
The film, which is 1:30 minutes long, includes two clips. The first is the “ confession”  of 
a captured Iraqi man who in front of the camera confirms that he is a soldier affiliated 
with the Ministry of Interior and that he has participated in rape of Sunni women. The 
second clip contains the “ implementation of God’ s judgment” , and shows the execution 
of the man. The last scene is accompanied by nashd. 
The “ Killing of a crusader spy”  is an example of visual manipulation, showing the 
fear and suffering, and finally the brutal execution of a captured enemy. Presented only in 
the Arabic language, its main target appears to be Arabs, in particular the Iraqi population 
or other Arabs who cooperate with the Crusaders or the Iraqi government. Intimidation of 
the enemy appears as its strategic goal of communication. 
 
ii. News reports from the “ Ministry of Information of the Islamic State of Iraq”  are 
issued on an almost daily basis, and cover all the provinces of the State, as well as all the 
member groups. Some serve to sum up a month’ s operations, others describe only one 
attack. A typical example is the news report dated November 28, 2006.254 It contains two 
announcements. One regards the “ Downing of six crusader planes north west of 
Baghdad” . It states that the Mujahideen of the ISoI in cooperation with the “ Army of the 
Mujahideen”  have responded to the recent directives from the leader of the ISoI calling 
for increased attacks against the “ Crusader”  forces and especially against their planes and 
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helicopters. The second announcement is a news report for the period October 20 – 
November 16 from the Iraqi province of Dayyla, which depicts 51 incidents of military 
operations, including among other things assassinations, IED attacks, launching of 
missiles, and sniper attacks.255 
Despite the fact that most messages from the “ Ministry of Information”  are 
translated and published on separate Arabic and English language blogs, the target 
audience seems mostly to be supporters of the Islamic State. The news reports carry 
informational and emotional value for the fighters, and represent a form of dialogue 
between various parties of the State, such as the report confirming that the mujahideen 
have responded to operational requests by the leader of the State. A linguistic propaganda 
technique employed by the “ Ministry of Information”  is the near-consequent naming of 
the USA as the “ USL (Ex-America)” . The USL stands for “ United States of Losers” , and 
is a simple, yet popularly resonated and comprehensible, attack on the enemy. 
 
iii. On December 9, 2006, the ISoI responded to the “ Iraq Study Group Report” 256 in 
a written commentary entitled “ The Baker-Hamilton Report and the American 
Failure” .257 It states that the U.S. discourse is no longer about victory or defeat in the war 
in Iraq, but rather that the only goal is to stop the Jihad in Iraq and restrict its expansion 
to other areas. It compares the “ Baker-Hamilton”  with the “ Sykes-Picot agreement” , 
claiming it is just another attempt to impede the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.258 
The commentary also condemns other Muslims, even other jihadist groups, for not 
supporting the Caliphate project, and for keeping a nationalistic profile. The commentary 
points to the history of the ’ umma, where nationalism and pan-Arabism have “ reaped the 
rewards of the Islamic Jihadist revolutions” . It concludes with a call to the jihadist 
brothers, urging them to be aware of the tricks of the American policy of establishing a 
secular Iraq, finally followed by Quranic quotes. 
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This commentary stands out as a short political-strategic document, based on 
historical examples of the failure of the ’ umma to create an Islamic Caliphate, urging 
Muslims to learn from these lessons and be aware of the “ political gimmick”  of the U.S. 
government. The commentary does not, however, go into great details, and is more 
religiously anchored than other jihadist strategic documents.259 The drawing of historical 
parallels is a favored rhetoric style among the jihadists, as in the comparison between the 
2006 Baker-Hamilton report and the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. The commentary 
targets both supporters and adversaries of the movement, and seeks to educate them on a 
political level. 
 
iv. Another short commentary, signed by the “ Ministry of Information”  and issued on 
December 13, 2006, praises the “ Salafist Group for Call and Combat’ s”  (GSPC) raids on 
western workers in Algeria.260 It mentions facts about the raid, and blesses the 
mujahideen in Algeria, “ the grandsons of the hero of Islam  riq bin Ziyd” . It calls for 
the establishment of an Islamic State in Algeria, and more generally urges all Muslims to 
revenge the harm done to Afghani and Iraqi Muslims, specifically denouncing the Shiites 
and the Crusaders. 
It is essentially a message which targets supporters, seeking to incite members by 
showing a successful attack. Again, historical references are made, as the message 
rhetorically links GSPC’ s fight to the early days of Islam, evoking the 8th century 
victorious Muslim commander  riq bin Ziyd who conquered the Iberian Peninsula. It 
also links the Algerian cause to the wider jihadist cause (Iraq and Afghanistan), and 
names the overall enemies to be Israel, the West and the Shiites. In effect, attacks on 
Shiites have become an increasingly important issue in the jihadist rhetoric, paralleling 
the escalation of Sunni and Shiite fighting in Iraq. It is furthermore worth noting that the 
numbers of killed and injured in the GSPC raid reported by ISoI may be inflated. The 
above commentary states that “ no less than twenty crusaders were killed”  in the GSPC 
attack. Official Algerian and Western sources reported that one Algerian driver was 
killed and 9 Western workers injured. The original GSPC statement claiming 
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responsibility for the attack did not mention specific numbers. Exaggeration of own 
capabilities may serve to increase self-confidence among fighters, and could also be part 
of a psychological warfare against the enemy. 
 
v. Al-Furqn released its first audio-visual production, a 58 minute-long film called 
“ Release the one who suffers” , on November 18, 2006.261 The video depicts a raid on a 
police station in al-Maqdadiyya in Iraq, with the objective of releasing mujahideen 
prisoners.262 Old video clips of jihadist leading figures, such as Osama bin Laden, Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abd al-Azz al-Muqrin (the former leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi 
Arabia) speak to the duty of every Muslim to wage jihad and to free their imprisoned 
brothers. Pictures and footage with evidence of torture in “ apostate”  prisons are also 
shown as admonition.263 The film depicts preparation for the attack, including planning, 
prayer, weapon collection, and shows clips from the attack and the liberation of the 
prisoners. This is followed by a description of the raid by ’Ab Farq al-’Ansr, a field 
commander of the MSC. He claims that the attack took place in March 2006 and that it 
resulted in the death of 25 “ apostate”  policemen and the destruction of 42 vehicles, 
including two American airplanes. The commander furthermore warns the Crusaders of 
more attacks. Three mujahideen who were killed during the operation receive praise as 
martyrs in the film. 
The video “ Release the one who suffers”  is an audio-visual piece seemingly set 
on propagating and legitimizing the movement. First, it shows a successful jihadist 
operation, most likely to boost the fighters’  morale. Second, it uses emotional techniques 
by showing mistreatment of Muslims, probably to demonize the enemy and legitimize 
violence against it. The clips of speeches by jihadist leaders offer authority to the 
message, and seem to target the consciousness of Muslims concerning their duty to 
support suffering brothers. Third, the video contains a religious style, blatant especially in 
the last part of the film which praises the martyrs and offers Quranic recital and nashd. 
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The video has only Arabic audio and Arabic language captions, indication of an Arabic 
speaking target audience. 
 
vi. On December 22, 2006, al-Furqn released an audio tape of a speech by ’ Amr al- 
Mu’ minn (“ Emir of the Believers” ) ’Ab Umar al-Baghdd, the leader of the “ Islamic 
State of Iraq” .264 The 18:22 minute long speech was entitled “ Say, Truth has appeared 
and Falseness has vanished” . It reviews the birth of the “ Islamic State of Iraq” , naming 
groups and tribal leaders that have sworn alliance to the State. Al-Baghdd praises the 
State’ s Sharia Court, which is established to “ mediate conflicts and quarrels”  and gives 
examples of its work. He also describes the composition of the Shura Council, which 
consist of representatives of all member groups in the State. Al-Baghdd laments the 
threat of nationalism, patriotism and paganism that Iraq faces, and states that the Islamic 
State refuses to negotiate with its enemies. Instead it offers a truce to U.S. President 
Bush, offering secure withdrawal within a month, on condition that all equipment and 
military bases are ceded to the Islamic State. The truce expires in two weeks from the 
announcement, and al-Baghdd urges President Bush not to “ miss this historical 
opportunity [...] as you missed the opportunity of truce that was presented before you by 
Shaykh Osama bin Laden” . Finally, despite his offer of armistice, al-Baghdd calls on 
the mujahideen to prepare for battle. Al-Baghdd concludes with recitation of “ slogans”  
for the mujahideen, quoting from the Quran. 
The ISoI leader’ s audio speech targets both followers and enemies of the 
movement. To the enemies, it simultaneously offers a truce and threatens with more 
attacks. The speech is, however, given in the Arabic language and only distributed on 
jihadist websites, and therefore one cannot necessarily assume that it reached the 
intended U.S. audience. The producers also most likely realize the limited reach of such a 
speech, and it is therefore expected that the general message was as much intended for 
followers as opponents. To followers, then, and the Muslim ’ umma in general, this audio 
speech offers basic information about the organization of the “ Islamic State of Iraq” . It 
points to the success of the state, and specifically the Sharia Court, hereby seeking to 
increase the followers’  motivation. At the same time, it indicates the difficult situation of 
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the State, as it urges for increased military efforts and support. The speech seems to aim 
at propagating the movement, in addition to perhaps intimidating enemies. 
 
c.  Summary 
Drawing from the above information about the media material from the “ Islamic 
State of Iraq” , one can conclude that the primary strategic goal of communication seems 
to be propagation of the movement by incitement of supporters in particular and of 
Muslims in general. The messages also seek to intimidate the enemy, and target the 
Muslim enemy (“ collaborators” ) more than the West. Addressing its Muslim audience, 
the Islamic State also seeks to inform about its activities as well as educate its audience 
on other events in the world – both in Western and Muslim spheres. Linking other areas 
to the Iraqi cause, it arguably seeks to build a global community for the movement. 
Furthermore, legitimization of the existence of the State and the activities of the global 
jihadist movement is generally seen in a historic view, admixed with religious and 
emotional arguments. Legitimization is, however, less salient here than in other jihadist 
propaganda, perhaps because the target audience is assumed to be already supportive of 
the movement.  To a certain degree, the media pieces also function as channels for 
specific messages intended for specific persons, thereby fulfilling a strategic goal of 
direct dialogue. 
 
2.2. Media jihad; Iraqi focus without group affiliation 
 
In addition to the “ Ministry of Information”  and al-Furqn, which represent a 
number of the Iraqi global jihadist-insurgency groups, several media establishments 
without group affiliation have contributed to the Iraqi-focused jihadist media campaign. 
Some of these establishments are prolific producers of news and propaganda material, 
whereas others have only produced a few media issuances. Some operate their own 
websites, but most distribute their material on the jihadist forums. 
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a.  Background 
“The Media Jihad Brigade” 
“ The Media Jihad Brigade”  (Katbat al-Jihd al-’ Ilm) is one the most active of 
these establishments. After the launch of its campaign in March 2005, it became 
particularly well-known for its monthly “ Harvest Reports”  from Iraq. The aim of the 
Brigade is, according to their opening statement: “ a full-scale propaganda war as the 
newest arm of the jihad [...] to influence the morale of our enemies … and expose the 
reality of what is happening to them in Iraq, so that the soldiers lose their faith in 
themselves and their commanders."265 Allegedly, the Brigade targets particularly the U.S. 
and has "sent to the soldiers, their dependents and families frightening, terrifying letters 
to shake them to the core".266 
The Harvest Reports have been published on a monthly basis since April 2005. 
They contain information about the losses that the Mujahideen in Iraq have inflicted on 
their enemies, including human losses, vehicle losses, aircraft losses, and war booty taken 
from the enemy. The Brigades claims that “ the losses for the Crusaders are far more than 
what is mentioned in this report, due to inability to get accurate figures when using 
missiles and mortar bombs against the HQ of the Crusaders, due to concealing of many 
operations for security reasons, and due to difficulties of receiving press releases from all 
mujahideen groups on the ground” .267 
The format of the Harvest Reports has changed significantly since it first was 
produced. A summary of reports from April 2005 till April 2006 comes in the format of a 
Power Point presentation. The reports published during the fall of 2006, however, are 
presented as high quality videos, bearing resemblance to Western or Arab satellite TV 
productions. The October 2006 report, for example, shows clips of attacks, while 
scrolling text informs about the month’ s “ harvest” . A news feed runs on the bottom of the 
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screen, presenting the most important attacks or other significant events of the month. 
The Harvest Reports are available both in Arabic and English. 
In addition to the focus on the jihad in Iraq, the Media Jihad Brigade has looked 
briefly to another geographical area. In December 2006, as the conflict in Somalia 
escalated and forum chatter about the issue flourished, the Brigade published a 
“ Comprehensive file on Somalia” . However, this is the exception of an otherwise Iraqi-
focused media campaign. 
 
Iraqi Islamic Media Center 
The Iraqi Islamic Media Center (al-Markaz al-Irq al-’ Islm l l-’ Ilm) has 
been less active during the time of research. While it has published one news report about 
clashes between Sunni mujahideen and Shiites in Iraq268, it has distinguished itself from 
other media groups by focusing on activities of the enemy. This has manifested itself in 
two publication series, one entitled “ Know your enemy” , and the other “ the Foreign Pen” . 
Two issues of the “ The Foreign Pen”  series have been issued. They include 
Arabic translations of American policy papers concerning Iraq.  One is a summary of a 
study published by the United States Institute for Peace entitled “ Scenarios of the 
Insurgency in Iraq“ , by Alan Schwartz. 269 The study was published in the United States 
in October 2006, and distributed online by the Iraqi Islamic Media Center two months 
later. 
So far, one “ Know your enemy”  document has been published. It treated the 
“ Freemasonry and terrorist organizations in Europe” , focusing in particular on the Italian 
Masonic Lodge and Gladio (the Nato clandestine stay-behind operation after WWII).270 
The author moves on to the Turkish branch “ Kontrgerilla” , and finally concludes in more 
familiar jihadist rhetoric, claiming that the Zionist forces maintain control over the entire 
“ Western terrorist project” , including Gladio, Mossad, and the CIA. The document is 
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written by a certain ’rkhn Muammad Al, and footnotes cite sources in English and 
Dutch language. 
 
The aqq Agency 
The aqq (“ Truth” ) Agency appears as a traditional news agency, reporting from Iraq. It 
distributes news on its own website, which has both Arabic and English versions.271 
While aqq covers events in which jihadists in Iraq are involved, its news have a 
particular focus on crimes committed against the Sunni population in Iraq. It also runs a 
section with weekly “ Human Rights”  reports, which describes Shiite atrocities against 
Sunnis. The multimedia section also contains several films showing suffering Sunnis, 
such as “ Sunni in Sawf jail”  and “ Ugly crime: killing three Sunnis in Iraq” . 
The aqq agency has furthermore produced a few documentary films. One is a 
lengthy description of the clash between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq entitled “ al-Sha al-
Rawfi – War on Islam” .272 Another documentary pays tribute to the jihadist media, and 
states that: “ The media war has no less importance than the war of tanks, rockets and 
explosive devices” .273 The narrator claims that the jihadist media in Iraq operate on two 
levels. The first level concerns the jihadists, and aims at spreading news about their 
operations and the state of their soldiers. The second level aims at influencing the general 
view of the Americans. An example of such an operation is the so-called “ media bomb”  
that was detonated by the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) for the celebration of the d.274 It 
was a video issued on the Internet October 22, 2006, entitled the “ Baghdad Sniper” . It 
showed how the Iraqi sniper “ Juba”  – a nickname allegedly given to him by American 
soldiers – assassinated coalition soldiers in Iraq. The video was spread on jihadist 
websites, but also received vast attention in Arab and Western mainstream news outlets. 
The narrator comments on the success of the video in influencing the general public, 
while clips from news channels reporting on the case, such as CNN, Reuters, and al-
Jazeera, are shown as evidence of its distribution world wide. The film was apparently 
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distributed over only three days, a fact that the narrator claims “ demonstrates the 
technological abilities of the Media Resistance” . aqq Agency’ s two documentary films 
were originally distributed only in Arabic, but the Sniper-film was re-released with 
English subtitles in March 2007. 
 
Qidat al-Jihd Media Brigade 
Late in December 2006, the Qidat al-Jihd Media Brigade distributed a video 
production, entitled “ Yes to the State of the Islamic Caliphate [Iraq]” .275 It was an almost 
5 minute long slide show montage with pictures presenting the conflict in Iraq from a 
jihadist point of view: images of suffering Muslims in Iraq combined with pictures of 
American soldiers, Western, Israeli and “ apostate”  Arab state leaders framed in burning 
flames, and crested with image of jihadist leaders such as bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and al-
Zarqawi. Accompanied with nashd and Quranic citations, it represents a standard 
jihadist propaganda piece. This was the only Qidat al-Jihd Media Brigade production 
observed on the web during the time of research. 
 
Al-Burq Media Establishment 
Al-Burq Media Establishment joined the online media jihad in September 
2006.276 Its opening statement, published September 5, announces that: 
“ The role of the media in decision making is well known, the media is a decisive factor, 
like money and military power. The media is part of the war that the Crusaders wage on 
Islamic Iraq. An army of masters of the media have fought the ’umma to brainwash and 
intimidate the people. Part of the media war effort tended to justify the invasion, another 
to intimidate the Muslim Iraqi population. Now we are starting a new phase in our media 
war and we establish al-Burq media establishment, a media enclave that will take care 
of the jihadi media inheritance which was formed by the orchestrators of Iraq, and will 
make it, if God wills, a flare that lights the way for those after us, to Jerusalem, and 
supports the sons of the ’umma when they are confronted by suspicions and lies from the 
unbelievers. [...] Al-Burq takes interest in digital and traditional media, its goal is to 
cover, follow, and analyze jihadist news from the Land of the two Rivers [Iraq], and put 
the news in a context that forms a true picture of what takes place in the country. There 
are tens of media organization and centers in the media field, and al-Burq does not aim 
at rivalry with these organizations, but rather at complementing them. Certainly, the 
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media production in Iraq is huge. But it remains in the category of “ news” . Therefore we 
need a group that works with analysis of the news and extraction of lessons learned, of 
the reasons and results of this period of the jihad that is going on in Iraq now. [...] Al-
Burq Media Establishment will be the body that includes the previously known al-
Burq Islamic Network, and al-Burq workshop.” 277 
The al-Burq Islamic Network is a jihadist web forum.278 The al-Burq workshop is a 
feature of the web forum, proposing projects for volunteers to assist in the media jihad.  
Al-Burq Media clearly has a focus on Iraq, and questions have been raised as to 
whether it is the media wing of the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI).279 While al-Burq Media 
has participated in several media projects of the IAI, it also promotes other Iraqi jihadist 
groups. These groups are the MSC, ’Ansr al-Sunna, Jaysh al-Rshidn, Jaysh al-
Mujhidn, Kat’ ib Thawrat al-Ashrn, al-Jabha al-’ Islmiyya l l-Muqwama al-
Irqiyya, Jaysh al-Ftin, A’ ib al-Irq al-Jihdiyya, Kat’ ib Qasss al-dil.280 The 
al-Burq Media website furthermore issues news about Iraq from various sources, 
including their own news, analysis, and reports, and news from international agencies 
such as AFP, al-Jazeera, and CNN. Al-Burq Media thus distinguishes itself to a certain 
degree from other similar news outlets by including sources other than jihadist ones. 
Also, a unique feature of al-Burq Media is its workshop project. Self-declared goals of 
the workshop are to guide viewers to jihadist websites as alternative sources to the 
Western media, to move visitors on the jihadist web forums out of a passive state of 
receiving information and into an active state of participation and production, and to 
carry out large-scale media operations.281 Al-Burq promises to oversee this work by 
providing suitable venues for meeting of brothers, and provide required material, designs 
and links. It suggests that workshop projects should include the release of speeches, 
improvement and re-distribution of important publications, design of banners, slide 
shows and animation presentation. Finally, it notes that “ this project will not apply and 
succeed without the participation of the brothers” . Examples of workshop projects that 
were carried out during the fall of 2006 were workshop no. 18: Translation of al-
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Muhjir’ s speech to English and French, and workshop no. 19: An archive compilation of 
all statements issued by the MSC.282 Earlier projects include, among others, the collection 
and translation of speeches by Ayman al-Zarqawi, an anthology of Osama bin Laden 
speeches, and the release of names of officers in the Shiite Badr Corps in Iraq. 
 
b.  Content Analysis and Summary of Jihadist Media with Iraqi 
focus 
The above describes the attributes of media issuances produced by media 
establishments in Iraq without a group affiliation. They seem to focus on the same cause, 
but vary slightly in choice of topics, target audience and strategies for conveying their 
message. 
First of all, there is little information available about who run these 
establishments, other than supporters of the jihadist cause in Iraq. The fact that they have 
access to material, such as news and video clips, from the Iraqi battlefield suggests that 
they are based in the area, but other geographical locations are also possible. It seems that 
several of the establishments use volunteers in their work, such as al-Burq Workshop 
and the “ Media Jihad Brigade” , both of which openly call for contributors and manpower 
to their new enterprise. 
Both supporters and enemies seem to be their targeted audience, at least according 
to their self-declared goals. The “ Media Jihad Brigade” , for example, stated that it targets 
U.S. soldiers and their families. This is, however, not observed directly in their issuances. 
Still, their monthly Harvest Report comes in both Arabic and English versions, indicating 
a desire for a wider readership. Also, the aqq Agency targets speakers of these two 
language groups with their separate English and Arabic websites. Al-Burq Media seems 
to take the translation a step further, offering also French material through their 
Workshop project. Finally, the “ Iraqi Islamic Media Center”  targets solely Arabic 
speakers, with translations of English language documents and news into Arabic. One can 
argue that the academic style suggests that the target audience belongs to an elite group. 
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On the other side, the “ al-Qaeda Media Jihad Brigade” , which also offers productions in 
Arabic only, relies mostly on pictures and nashd, and is therefore perhaps suitable also 
for the many illiterates in the Arab world. 
There appears to be diverse strategic goals of communication, obtained by 
different techniques. A self-stated goal of the “ Media Jihad Brigade”  is to lower the 
morale of the enemy, something their Harvest Report might theoretically succeed in 
doing if it actually reaches the enemy. Moreover, the Harvest Report informs the 
mujahideen of their successes, with a possible desired effect of boosting the morale of 
fighters and supporters. The high technical sophistication of the Harvest Report videos 
arguably adds to the feeling of success. A different approach is taken in the aqq 
Agency’ s media productions, which focus on the defeats of and crimes against the Iraqi 
Sunni mujahideen. While the aqq’ s strategic goal of communication also seems to be 
propagation of the movement, it describes the movement as harmed and unjustly treated, 
and therefore in need of support. Graphic and emotional techniques, such as when 
showing tortured Sunnis, indicate this approach. Furthermore, the approach represents a 
means of legitimizing ‘revenge’  activities of the mujahideen, although aqq does not 
seem to focus on such operations. 
aqq also seeks to educate supporters of the movement with its documentaries. A 
perhaps even stronger example of education is the publications in the series “ Know your 
enemy”  and “ Foreign Pen” . The series offer material that arguably would remain out of 
reach for many Iraqis. 
Al-Burq Media’ s many activities seem to seek the strategic goals of 
communication observed with the other groups, i.e. propagation, legitimization and 
education. However, one additional goal can be seen in their workshop project: The effort 
to activate supporters and dynamically incorporate volunteers in the media jihad points to 
an objective of creating a strong feeling of belonging and a sense of community among 
supporters. 
One can thus conclude that the main strategic goals of communication among 
these media establishments are propagation, legitimization, education, and the creation of 
a sense of community. 
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2.3. Other Iraqi insurgency groups’ media wings 
Finally, a number of other Iraqi militant groups, which did not swear loyalty to 
the “ Islamic State of Iraq”  in October 2006, also participate in the jihadist media 
campaign. During the fall of 2006, postings on jihadist forums and statements from these 
groups spoke to the relationship of the Iraqi Sunni insurgency to al-Qaeda and the 
“ Islamic State of Iraq” . What appeared as hardliner global jihadists requested unity of the 
Iraqi jihad under the al-Qaeda banner, whereas nationalist, specifically Baathist and 
Kurdish, forces argued in favor of a separation between the Iraqi and the global jihadist 
cause. This debate culminated in March-April 2007, when ’Ab ‘Umar al-Baghdd, the 
ISoI leader, accused the insurgency groups of cooperating with the US-backed Iraqi 
government. At the same time, mujahideen of the ISoI launched a series of attacks on 
Sunni Muslims, and killed the leader of 1920 Revolution Brigades, rith hir al-!r, 
who had refused to join the ISoI.  In response, several of the Iraqi insurgency groups split 
over the issue of support to the “ Islamic State of Iraq” . A breakaway faction of the 1920 
Revolution Brigades, for example, established the anti-ISoI “ Hamas-Iraq”  group, and the 
“ Islamic Army of Iraq”  denounced the “ Islamic State of Iraq”  in an Internet issued letter, 
although the letter was later removed from the IAI website following reactions on jihadist 
forums. This ‘Iraqi nationalist insurgency versus global jihad’ - debate received attention 
in the Arab and Western press, and the spokesman of the IAI appeared in an al-Jazeera 
interview where he explained his group’ s views.283 
The internal debate among Sunni insurgency groups in Iraq about support to al-
Qaeda and the ISoI indicates that the groups balance between nationalism and global 
jihadism. At this point, it is difficult to predict what the outcome of the dispute will be; 
Political analysts have suggested advantages for both the global al-Qaeda movement and 
for the Iraqi national unity government. 
Iraq holds a special place in the global jihad, and news of and by the Iraqi 
mujahideen constitutes an important part of the general global jihadist media campaign, 
as observed in the use of news reports and battlefield videos from various Iraqi groups in 
productions. Therefore, without categorically placing the Iraqi Sunni insurgency groups 
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under the header of the global jihadist movement, a brief description of their media jihad 
will be included in this study. 
 
The Islamic Army in Iraq 
Al-Jaysh al-’ Islm f l-Irq (“ The Islamic Army of Iraq” , IAI) is one of the 
largest insurgency groups in Iraq, and one that expressed anger with al-Qaeda in April 
2007 – although previous information indicates a closer relationship.284 On the media 
scene, the IAI spreads its material through various channels. Its “ Military leadership”  
issues newsletters of operational character, often several per day. Its “ Central Media 
Organization”  is responsible for the audio-visual material. It has most notably produced 
the infamous “ Juba Sniper”  videos, a joint venture with al-Burq Media. The “ Juba 
Sniper”  was released in November 2005, followed by a sequel in October 2006. With the 
second video, a website (http://www.jubaonline.org) and a blog (http://juba-
online.blogspot.com) were also set up in the name of Juba. The website links to the films, 
and offers additional information in Arabic, English, and French. As the aqq Agency 
reported in its documentary about the “ Juba Sniper”  film, it received attention in 
mainstream press, and also found its way to YouTube. 
The IAI operates an Arabic language website (http://www.iaisite.info) where 
media issuances are published, but these are also distributed on various jihadist forums. 
IAI furthermore distributes a periodic electronic magazine, al-Fursn. In October 2006, 
issue no. 10 was published online. The 67 pages long magazine contained articles about 
jihad in Iraq in particular, but also included more general topics. The 10 first pages were 
dedicated to “ Harvest” , showing statistics on IAI’ s attacks for the first six months of the 
year. This was followed by sections for political, strategic, and military affairs, as well as 
religious topics, rounded off with jihadist poetry. It is worth noting that the IAI offers 
extensive coverage of American military affairs, such as American losses in Iraq and 
stories about American soldiers fleeing to Canada. The rest mixes conspiracy theories, 
such as “ The Jewish-Kurdish relationship” , boasting, such as “ The jihad in Afghanistan, 
its tactics inspired by the Iraq method” , and the customary Islamist ideology, here in the 
pen of ’ Ibn Taymiyya.  
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’Ansr al-Sunna 
The ’Ansr al-Sunna (“ Supporters of the Sunna) Group is another major 
insurgency group in Iraq – and also a prolific contributor to the media campaign there. 
’Ansr al-Sunna was one of the groups that early copied al-Zarqawi’ s media strategy, 
distributing video recordings of decapitation of enemy hostages. While these are less 
frequently observed now, ’Ansr al-Sunna’ s Media Department issues recordings of 
military operations on a regular basis. These are generally short, relatively professionally 
produced video clips, depicting attacks with IED, mortars, etc. The Media Department 
issues daily written news reports about operations, and also official statements from the 
leadership of the group. Such statements have been issued, for instance, as an assessment 
on the closing of Baghdad University.285 ’Ansr al-Sunna furthermore publishes an 
online periodical, “ Harvest of the Mujahideen” , of which issue no. 34 was released in 
October 2006.286 It contained information about the group’ s activities, comments on the 
Pope’ s remark on Islam, blessings from the Department of Law and Justice for Ramadan, 
and advice on security measures for the mujahideen “ guerilla fighters” . 
The ’Ansr al-Sunna does no longer operate a website. Until at least early 2005, it 
maintained a site, although it was constantly moving from one URL to another. Their 
media material is now distributed on the jihadist web forums. 
 
Other groups 
Other insurgent groups in Iraq handle their media campaign much in the same 
way as ’Ansr al-Sunna. Groups with media wings that are active on the Internet include, 
most notably, al-Jabha al-’ Islmiyya l l-Muqwama al-Irqiyya and its Military wing 
the Kat’ ib al al-Dn al-’Ayb, Kat’ ib Thawrat al-Ashrn, Jaysh al-Rshidn, Jaysh 
al-Mujhidn, Jaysh al-Ftin, Kat’ ib Qasss al-dil and A’ ib al-Irq al-
Jihdiyya. The latter operates its own website in both Arabic and English287, whereas the 
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others rely on jihadist web forums for distribution of their news. Like ’Ansr al-Sunna 
their main production and distribution include daily reports about military operations, 
often accompanied with video recordings.288 
 
2.4. Summary Jihadist Media in Iraq 
The Iraqi jihadist media scene is diversified in the sense that it is comprised of a 
large number of different media establishments, using a wide range of methods in order 
to reach a number of strategic goals of communication. Yet, their media jihad has certain 
common features, and, moreover, features that are characteristic to Iraqi-focused jihadist 
media outlets. 
First, a distinctive but perhaps less surprising characteristic is that the sender and 
receiver of the media material seem to belong to a rather limited group, consisting 
generally of Iraqis. Due to their extensive access to source material, senders seem to be 
located in, or at least have direct links with, Iraq, and while some material targets a 
Western public, a large majority of media issuances clearly address an Iraqi audience. As 
a result, media topics may cover events in the entire world, but the news are seen from an 
Iraqi jihadist perspective, and framed likewise. It is worth noting, however, that the group 
of Iraqi media receivers also includes opponents – such as Shiites and Kurds. So, while 
serious attempts of intimidation of Western enemy are scarce, intimidation of non-
jihadists Iraqis seem to flourish. 
Their strategic goals of communication generally correspond with those of other 
jihadist media, including propagation, education, and intimidation. Legitimization is also 
present, but seems to be less obvious as in other non-Iraqi media outlets. This may be 
explained by the fact that Iraqi media address primarily supporters who already adhere to 
the jihadist cause. Furthermore, one can observe direct communication (dialogue) 
between different Iraqi groups in their media issuances. Despite their close geographical 
location, war-torn Iraq may well prevent physical contact between the group members, 
leaving dialogue through media as the preferred option. On the other hand, it is worth 
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keeping in mind the current low level of Internet access in Iraq.289 Finally, the creation of 
a sense of community among Iraqi jihadists also stands out as a strategic goal of 
communication. One may argue that this is a goal inherent in most acts of communication 
– with the exception of intimidating communicative exchanges – but the incorporation of 
individuals in the media work and the interactive media features nonetheless emphasize 
the specific community building efforts of communication in Iraq. 
The framework of the jihadist media of Iraq is to a large extent shaped by the 
ongoing war with U.S. and allied troops, and most issues that are treated in their media 
concern this conflict. The conflict is presented as an extension of the Crusader war, and a 
defensive struggle for freedom and human rights against the unjust invasion of Muslim 
land. As sectarian violence has increased in Iraq over the last years, the divergence 
between Sunnis and Shiites saturates the rhetoric. This dichotomy is even employed 
when referring to other geographical regions where the Sunni-Shiite relationship is not an 
issue, such as in Algeria. News furthermore focus on defeats of the enemies, and the 
jihadists’  own losses are framed as heroic martyrdom deaths. The portrayal of Iraqi 
jihadist institutions as equal to state institutions is also noteworthy: The Iraqi jihadist 
media presents the “ Islamic State of Iraq”  with ministries, a court, and a leader who 
himself addresses U.S. President George W. Bush. 
Finally, some of the media material coming out of Iraq appears more violent than 
other jihadist media. Examples are execution, in particular beheading, videos. While this 
has been characteristic of al-Qaeda branches in several places, the particularly aggressive 
theatre of war that Iraq has become seems to be reflected in the jihadist media issuances. 
 
 
V. Analysis of the online media jihad 
 
The introduction of this study presented general studies on terrorism and media, 
and some rather specific examinations of jihadism and the Internet. Based on the previous 
theories about the terrorist use of media, a hypothesis for this study was outlined: 
The jihadists operate within a pronounced strategy concerning the use of the 
media. The Internet, playing a crucial role in this media strategy, allows the 
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jihadists to directly frame their message, and is used in order to reach the 
following  strategic goals of communication: propagation of movement and the 
cause, legitimization of movement and activities, and intimidation of opponents. 
These assumptions have served as guidelines for this study on the jihadist online media 
campaign. The study has thus far presented empirical evidence about the current state of 
jihadist media, and has by doing so only implicitly addressed the assumptions in the 
hypothesis. In the following, a more explicit examination of the different aspects of the 
hypothesis compared to the findings in the study will be presented. 
 
1. Words vs. Deeds: Media strategy in theory and 
practice 
An issue pertinent to the aspect of consistency between jihadist media strategy 
and practice is the question of whether there in fact exists a strategy. This study has 
collected numerous texts by leaders and strategists of the jihadist movement, and has 
sought to identify theories about the use of media. As previously mentioned, it is 
important to keep in mind that neither of these theories presents a comprehensive media 
strategy. Rather, each theory seems to treat different elements. In a holistic perspective, 
one can therefore argue that the theories together represent a strategy for the use of 
media. Accordingly, this study argues that, in theory, there indeed seems to exist a basis 
for a jihadist media strategy. It is worth noting that the form and content of this media 
strategy are prone to evolve over time: the jihadi media campaign appears as a constantly 
evolving phenomenon which to a large extent is shaped by the jihadist media companies. 
As new companies emerge with new templates for their work, they arguably form part of 
the jihadist media strategy.290 
Having determined that there exists a potential strategy for the jihadist media 
campaign, the following discussion deals with the consistency between this strategy, as 
deducted from jihadist strategic literature, and the current jihadist online media practice. 
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Old versus new media 
First, it is worth clarifying the relationship between new and traditional media in 
the jihadist media strategy. The ‘media strategy in theory’ , as outlined in the above, 
indicates that the preferred method of distribution of jihadist media material includes a 
combination of new and traditional media. This study has focused solely on new media, 
mainly because the large amount of Internet-based media indicates that it is an 
increasingly important means of communication for jihadists today. The strategic advice 
from jihadist strategists, such as al-Sr, to combine new and old media appears to be 
carried out in practice by continuing local distribution of old media, such as printed 
publications, while waging a global media jihad with new means online. Some of the 
online publications also seem intended for local print and distribution in the mosques and 
marketplaces, or at least the media companies encourage such distribution. While this 
author possesses limited knowledge about the actual local distribution of traditional 
jihadist media – although it is well-known that CDs of speeches and violent operations 
along with print magazines are sold in marketplaces in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan – it 
seems apparent that traditional media, both Arabic and Western, no longer are the main 
vehicles for or sources of information about the jihadist movement.  
 
Mainstream versus jihadist media 
On another note, one can argue that the jihadists have over the last few years 
placed less emphasis on mainstream media, both new and traditional: The global jihadist 
movement seems lately unable to receive continuous and extensive coverage in 
mainstream media. In fact, since late 2001, due to the illegal nature of the al-Qaeda 
movement, no interviews or other publications from the jihadists have been first released 
in its entirety in traditional mainstream Western or Arabic media. Al-Qaeda remains a hot 
topic both in the West and the Middle East, but news about the movement in mainstream 
media is allegedly presented consistently from a non-jihadist perspective. In parallel, one 
can observe the sharp increase in online publications with jihadist ownership and control.  
One can also assume that the exclusion of the global jihadist movement from 
active participation in Western mainstream media stands in the way of the explicit goal of 
reaching the Western public. Several of the strategic texts suggested a more active 
approach towards the Western public, focusing on the importance of targeting the West, 
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and encouraged the use of Western, in particular online, media. In fact, we have 
witnessed increasing efforts to translate media material into foreign languages. English is 
the main language after Arabic, but also German, French and Spanish are used. The 
jihadists have also made use of Westerners, such as the American convert Adam Gadahn, 
also known as Azzm al-’Amrk, who seemingly target a U.S. public in English. Focus 
on issues of alleged importance to the Western society, such as U.S. foreign and domestic 
politics, may also be a way of targeting the West. Yet, thus far, the global jihadist 
movement seems mainly to have relied on media outlets with jihadist ownership and 
control in its efforts to reach Western societies. Consequently, one can ask to what extent 
the message actually reaches the Western public, as the jihadist sites remain difficult to 
access for outsiders due to password protection and frequent change of URLs. One 
should, however, not ignore the role of mainstream journalists: jihadist media material is 
often picked up by mainstream, Western journalists and presented in mainstream media 
outlets. This has been labeled a “ two-step flow of information: terrorist to journalists via 
the Internet to the public” .291 
 
Audience segmentation 
Targeting the West seems to be part of a larger strategy of audience segmentation. 
Jihadist media strategists recommend the distribution of audience-tailored messages, and 
operate with a general separation between friendly and adversary audiences. It is also 
suggested that the audience’ s level of education is taken into consideration when 
producing media material. In practice, it is interesting to note that a large number of 
jihadist media explicitly state the target audience: “ To the West”  or “ To the Brothers in 
Iraq”  are typical titles of messages. Yet, messages with such titles may also contain 
material intended for other audience segments, and in many cases the target audience 
consequently appears different than communicated in the title. Thus, message titles may 
have more of a rhetoric value than truly revealing the final target audience.  
Furthermore, certain characteristics of a text, audio or video production indicate a 
certain target audience, as shown in the content analysis of media material. Language is 
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one such easily detectable factor, and Western languages, as mentioned above, are 
increasingly used. One can also observe the use of other languages, such as Pashto, Urdu, 
Somali, Albanian, indicating that the jihadists target a potentially Muslim, non-Arabic 
speaking public. Productions also seem to vary with regard to cultural and educational 
levels, as recommended in jihadist media strategy. Text and oral messages seem to target 
highly educated individuals with eloquence and argumentation on a sophisticated level. 
But they also include simple and straightforward messages that require little intellectual 
effort. Picture and sound are allegedly easily accessible to illiterates, and generally have 
great emotional resonance at all levels. Furthermore, we observe what seems to be 
audience segmentation along gender lines: Women seem to be targeted with topics which 
allegedly are particularly pertinent to them, such as family life. 
These efforts seem to follow the specific recommendation and the great concern 
of the global jihadist movement in general, of reaching a wide as possible audience. 
Jihadist strategists, such as al-Sr and al-Zawahiri, deplored the failure of previous 
jihadist media campaigns to reach the masses. While the elite segment of the jihadist 
movement is still identified as a target for certain productions, to date one cannot exclude 
the possibility that the large and varied jihadist media productions have been more 
successful than in the past in reaching out to the masses. However, the problem with 
difficult Internet access for a large number of potential supporters remains an obvious 
obstacle to their success in this regard. 
 
Public opinion 
A recurring topic among jihadist strategists, largely related to the issue of 
audience, is the question of public opinion. As previously stated, this study does not 
attempt to measure neither the jihadist media campaign’ s influence on the public, nor the 
public reactions to jihadist media. Nonetheless, it aims to treat the question of how the 
jihadist media strategy is aware of public opinion. 
Opinion polls offer certain indications about the public opinion on the global 
jihadist movement, and show that only a minority both in the West and the Middle East 
support al-Qaeda and its activities – although a notable number appear to support some of 
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its ideas.292 Accordingly, one may jump to the conclusion that the jihadist media 
campaign has failed to consider the public opinion. However, certain characteristics of 
the media jihad suggest that some efforts may have been made in order not to repulse the 
general public. First, we have observed a decreasing number of videos showing 
decapitation of enemies. This decline seems to have followed al-Zawahiri’ s letter to al-
Zarqawi in Iraq, in which he stated that even though decapitation may be a legitimate 
practice, the public opinion may not approve of it. Second, while jihadist media material 
still contain graphic, violent accounts and representations, they also seem to follow the 
book of jihadist media strategy as such acts are often accompanied by elaborate religious, 
historical and/or political legitimization. Legitimization, particularly if based on Islamic 
and salafist-jihadist terms, supposedly resonates specifically well with Muslims. When, 
in addition, it is based on historic arguments, it may also target a wider public of potential 
supporters. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that media material from Iraq that 
contains some of the most violent and possibly repulsive material also seems to be the 
most void of direct legitimization. 
 
Organization of media groups 
Jihadist strategists treat the organization of the media groups in their works. Due 
to the illegal nature of the global jihadist movement, it is difficult to gain access to 
information about how the theories are implemented in practice, and it has therefore not 
been examined in detail in this study. Yet, the recommendation by strategists to create 
media groups and information brigades as separate organizational entities certainly seems 
to be carried out. It is also evident that the media groups work closely with other 
organizational entities, as recommended by jihadist strategists. The work of the media 
groups seems to pick up on events carried out by political and military wings of the 
movement, and strives to maximize the effect of these events. For example, videos of 
hostage situations, and translations of political or ideological speeches, add a media 
dimension to these events, making them more accessible and comprehensible to the 
public. 
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Furthermore, a picture of how different jihadist media groups organize - or fail to 
do so - has to a certain degree emerged during the research. Here, this study will mention 
only one dimension of this, which has to do with profusion – an issue treated by jihadist 
media strategists. The jihadist media groups are aware of each other, and even state that 
they are not competitors, but rather form supplements to each other. Yet, they cover the 
same topics in a somewhat overlapping way, often leading to an abundance of reports 
about the same topic. This seemingly chaotic state of the jihadist media may have 
strategic value, as explained by the theorists: The repetition of a topic in different outlets 
and in different forms sets the agenda, states salience, and contributes to making the 
cause look more important and the group more powerful than what is perhaps the case. 
This is something the jihadist media groups appear to have succeeded with over the last 
years, as they have used the Internet as a media outlet and sought to lavishly spread their 
message across the world. It is also worth noting that the main channels for online 
diffusion are the web forums, and not static home pages of the media groups. This 
coincides with the suggestion of one strategist who encouraged the use of precisely 
discussion forums in order to generate active participation in the media jihad. 
 
Refuting mainstream media 
The basis for most jihadist comments and strategies about the media is the 
perception of control of media by ‘the West’  and local governments and their consequent 
abuse of the media dominance to distort, silence or discredit the jihadists. Returning to 
the introduction to this study, former U.S. Minister of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
expressed his concern about the pre-eminence of media manipulation by terrorists. In 
fact, Rumsfeld’ s comment was perceived as a victory by some of the jihadist media 
groups and as evidence of their success.293 The fact that the perception of a jihadist media 
triumph for a moment reigned on both sides of the current battle front may perhaps 
indicate that the jihadist media campaign has been more successful than in the past. 
However, this alleged success reveals nothing about the actual role of the jihadist media 
strategy in this effort, making it subject to speculation. What seems clear, however, is that 
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the jihadist media groups make continuous efforts to refute media reports from 
mainstream local and Western press and generally improve the jihadist media campaigns. 
 
Summary – words versus deeds 
One may conclude that the majority of the theories put forth by jihadist strategists 
concerning the use of the media appear to have been incorporated in the actual jihadist 
media campaign. This does not necessarily mean that the campaign follows one jihadist 
media strategy: Rather, it seems that they have adopted a number of the suggested 
theories for the use of the media on a tactical level. In this study, it has been impossible to 
measure exactly the extent to which some of the recommendations presented in these 
theories, such as targeting the masses and considering public opinion, have been 
implemented. The other theories seem to be followed in the jihadist media campaign on 
the whole. Yet, one should remember that the media jihad campaign as presented in this 
study consists of a number of interlinked campaigns, driven by different local al-Qaeda 
branches and larger media companies. Thus, not all strategic recommendations are 
observed in all of the campaigns. Nevertheless, as all the campaigns are carried out on the 
Internet, they tend to, intentionally or not, form a virtual whole, potentially perceived as 
one media jihad campaign. 
 
2. Strategic goals of communication 
The hypothesis of this study assumes that the jihadists seek to achieve a set of 
strategic goals of communication through their media campaign: propagation of the 
movement, legitimization of activities, and intimidation of enemies. The assumption is 
based on conclusions from Corman and Schiefelbein’ s study about jihadist media and 
Schmid and de Graaf’ s theories about terrorism and media. This study’ s survey of jihadist 
strategic thought about the use of media has identified four explicitly articulated goals of 
communication, in fact adding the goal of education of supporters to the three goals 
mentioned in the above. In practice, this study has observed six different strategic goals 
of communication in the media jihad, including two additional goals: dialogue between 
members of the movement, and community-building.  
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These goals merit to be elaborated on in further detail. First, it is worth noting that 
these goals could be seen as overlapping, and are in any case prone to be interpreted as 
broad conceptual categories. For example, propagation of the movement may include a 
number of aspects, but is here intended to mean the spreading of the ideas of jihadism, 
and recruitment of new supporters or strengthening of faith among existing supporters. 
Also legitimization of existence and activities of the movement has proven to include 
both Quranic, historical and political arguments, and can be presented by clerics and 
laymen. With regards to intimidation of enemies, one can argue that the mere existence of 
a jihadist media campaign may be perceived as intimidating. However, this study has 
considered only media material that specifically addresses the enemy in menacing terms 
as attempts of intimidation of the enemy. Furthermore, education as a strategic goal of 
communication has in this study been interpreted as referring to material of purely 
informational character. While the media companies no longer usually are in charge of 
the distribution of traditional training manuals,294 education is indeed observed on 
religious, political, and military levels. One could argue that education consequently can 
be interpreted as a means to propagate the movement, in effect overlapping with that 
strategic goal of communication. What is more, the concept of dialogue has only been 
considered as a strategic goal when two or more parties are involved and explicitly 
communicate through media issuances. Finally, the study has registered community-
building as a strategic goal of communication when, for example, new or distant branches 
of al-Qaeda are promoted online, or when Muslim suffering in far-away places is cited - 
seemingly with the goal of creating a transnational conscience and virtual solidarity. One 
can argue that this interpretation of community-building in fact may overlap with the goal 
of propagation of the movement. More specifically, then, community-building denotes 
the encouragement to active participation of supporters in the online media jihad. 
Returning to the hypothesis, the three main strategic goals of communication for 
terrorists seem indeed to be present in the jihadist media campaign. These goals were 
mainly indicative of how terrorists use traditional media, such as mainstream press and 
television. It is therefore interesting, but perhaps somewhat less surprising, to note that 
the jihadists have used the Internet as a similar basis for communication. What is more, 
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the Internet offers additional options for strategic communication. The Internet, acting as 
a channel for jihadist-based media, thus seems to facilitate the expansion of the media 
jihad outside the boundaries imposed by the role of traditional, mainstream media. For 
example, traditional mainstream media could allegedly not lend itself as well as the 
Internet to act as a platform for education of supporters, nor would it perhaps represent a 
means for community-building to the same degree. As for dialogue between groups or 
individuals within a terrorist movement, it could arguably take place indirectly in 
traditional mainstream media through for example coded messages, but it is more easily 
carried out through online media. The Internet, and the opportunity it offers for creation 
of own media outlets, consequently appears as a more suitable channel for terrorist 
communications than traditional media, as it expands the functionalities of the jihadi 
online media campaign. 
On the other hand, traditional mainstream media, as described by Schmidt and de 
Graaf, also offer passive uses.295 As this study set out to examine jihadists’  active uses of 
their own media outlets, these passive uses fall outside its scope. Yet, some of the passive 
uses, potentially representing powerful means for terrorists, are indeed also employed 
through the Internet, and therefore merit to be mentioned. As noted above, mainstream 
media channels offer information that easily is spread to jihadist sites, and we have 
observed the jihadists using these channels to access information such as the enemies’  
troops, public reactions to terror activities, and counterterrorism measures.296 This 
passive use of the media is a secondary, yet non-negligible, strategic goal of the media 
jihad. 
 
Having established that the jihadists use the Internet for different strategic goals 
of communication, it could be useful to try to assess the hierarchy of jihadist use of these 
goals. A preliminary statistical summary of the empiric material used in this study reveals 
14 cases of propagation of the movement, 4 cases of education of supporters, 4 cases of 
intimidation, 3 cases of legitimization, 2 cases of community-building, and 1 case of 
dialogue. Propagation of the movement thus seems to emerge as the considerably largest 
goal. This should perhaps not come as a surprise, as the goal of propagation also is the 
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 See appendix I in this study. 
296
 See part III, chapter 1.3. “ ...And Beyond” , in this study. 
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broadest conceptual category. It is maybe more surprising to observe the relatively high 
score of education, a use which was not included in Schmidt and de Graf’ s list. The other 
goals score rather evenly, with dialogue appearing the less significant part of the media 
jihad according to this short survey. 
It is worth keeping in mind that one media production may, and typically does, 
contain several strategic goals of communication. All goals are observed relatively evenly 
with the different – local and global, producer and distributor – jihadist media companies.  
 
3. Framing jihadism 
The hypothesis assumes that jihadist-controlled media outlets on the Internet 
facilitate the framing and constructing of a jihadist worldview. Without going into details 
about the jihadist message or ideology, which is undeniably spread through the jihadist 
media, this study has nevertheless observed aspects of what seems to be a preferred 
jihadist framework for their self-narrative. A theoretical model for framing the ‘war on 
terror’  proposed four levels of perception: problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation. In addition to other observations, these 
four levels of perception will in the following be used to explain the jihadist framing of 
the conflict. 
In fact, the jihadist problem definition seems to resemble ideas that have emerged 
from a Western sphere. The concept of a ‘clash of civilizations’  is repeatedly put forth in 
jihadist media, as a basic explanation for their conflict with the West. In the jihadist 
frame, the Western civilization is the aggressive part that has provoked the conflict, and 
the U.S. current “ imperialism”  is seen as the latest manifestation of the Crusades. In fact, 
the behavior of the West and local regimes are allegedly manifestations of an historical 
enmity toward Islam, presented as the reason for the jihadists’  so-called current defensive 
war. The jihadist causal interpretation therefore seems to include the perception of self-
defense of Muslims against evil forces. The moral evaluation appears to lie in the 
religious aspect, which highlights Islam as the one true religion, and reminds the Muslims 
about their personal duty (far ayn) to protect and spread their religion. A jihadist 
treatment recommendation disseminated through the media is seen in the call to unite the 
’ umma, and continue to fight evil and defend Islam. A “ middle way”  is rejected as 
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unacceptable, as moderate Muslim scholars and Muslims cooperating with allied troops 
(in Iraq, for instance) are considered apostates and traitors. 
The killing of apostates and other forms of violence is moreover often presented 
within terms of “ moral disengagement” .297 Jihadists present violent actions as an 
inevitable result of compelling circumstances (the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example) 
forced upon the weak, thereby “ displacing the responsibility”  to the enemy. Enemy 
targets are also “ demonized”  as oppressors and tyrants, and American soldiers in Iraq 
“ de-humanized”  as mere symbols of the Crusader state. Another rhetoric aspect is the 
“ making of advantageous comparisons” , in which the jihadist violence is compared to 
supposedly far more violent behavior of the enemy (for instance torture in Iraqi prisons). 
Furthermore, the jihadists frame their message as if they represent the whole 
’ umma, e.g. all Muslims, pretending to defend Islam and Muslim rights. Moreover, 
messages are framed on a ‘state-level’  in Iraq, where the global jihadists have announced 
the establishment of a caliphate: the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq addresses Western 
state leaders, for example offering them ultimatums. Jihadist military power is also 
presented as being on the same, and sometimes even on a superior, level as that of enemy 
states. For example, the defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan in 1989 is frequently 
mentioned; it seems to represent the ultimate jihadist victory, and is by jihadists presented 
as the reason for the fall of the Soviet Union two years later. One could argue that Iraq 
now is emerging as an heir to Afghanistan in the jihadist social construction: The foreign 
occupation forces in Iraq are already determined to lose the war, as the Russians lost the 
war in Afghanistan, and the U.S. would subsequently be on the verge of loosing its world 
hegemony, according to the jihadist cause-effect logic. On the jihadist side of the 
battlefield, human losses are framed in positivist terms as martyrdoms. 
Norris’  theory about terrorism and framing suggests that news frames of terrorism 
“ simplify, prioritize and structure the narration” . It is intuitively evident that jihadist 
media would structure the account according to their priorities, thereby setting a certain 
agenda and giving salience to certain issues. Mainstream news coverage of terrorism may 
well lend itself to simplification of the narration in order to reach its public. Jihadist-
based media, on the other hand, seem to attempt to present a more detailed and 
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comprehensive world view with its extensive coverage. Nevertheless, a rather analogous 
rhetoric is observed in various al-Qaeda online fronts. This rhetoric preaches an Islamic 
state based on sharia, refutes the Western, secular and democratic model, and is hateful 
towards the United States. By employing a radicalized interpretation of the Quran and 
reducing individuals and social and political mechanisms to stereotypes, the jihadists 
strive to present a simple, yet attractive edict to their followers.  
 
4. General Observations 
In an attempt to gather characteristics and particularities of the online media jihad 
that exceed the specific research questions of the hypothesis, this chapter seeks to sum up 
different qualities of the jihadist media campaign that have been observed during the 
analysis of empirical material. 
 
Characteristics of jihadist media groups 
In addition to efforts to achieve strategic goals of communication and frame a 
jihadist worldview, the media groups also fill more tactical roles. A number of the largest 
and most well-known media companies, such as as-Sab and al-Fajr may be labeled 
‘authentificators’ : Because of their long existence, and the persistence and alleged quality 
of their media campaign, such companies are seemingly acknowledged by online 
supporters as authorities – and the media material they produce as authentic. It is 
interesting to note that also when such companies act as distributors of media material 
produced by sometimes unknown militant groups, the material appears to be just about 
automatically accepted by an otherwise relatively skeptical community of online 
jihadists. The logo of a senior media distributor company on a media issuance published 
by an official ‘correspondent’  thus seems to work as a stamp of authenticity of the 
material. 
Furthermore, it seems that the media companies, both senior and junior, play a 
role as ‘agenda setters’  within the global jihadist community. First, the media companies 
apparently influence each other: a story published by one media company will often be 
picked up by the others, and make the ‘tour of the web’ . Second, the media companies 
seem to shape interests within the online community: it is common to find discussions on 
the jihadist web forums about topics that have been promoted through media issuances. 
 113 
The variety of the jihadist media appears to have something to offer to almost all 
supporters, and possibly influences or sets the agenda within the different strata of 
adherents to the jihadist media. 
The abundance of jihadist media material that one can observe, and the 
overlapping coverage of issues, arguably turns the media companies into ‘force 
multipliers’ . This notion indicates that the media companies reinforce the importance of a 
certain issue by ‘bombarding’  the websites with it. Videos and messages are then 
reposted to other sites, often by individuals. Moreover, this ‘force multiplier’  role of the 
jihadist media companies can be found in the efforts to increase the value of a terrorist 
incident. One can argue that attacks, suicide operations, and hostage situations would 
perhaps not have been as ‘profitable’  for the jihadists without the attention that their 
media attracts to them. 
 
Hierarchy and organization of the media jihad 
It seems fair to conclude that the Internet has facilitated the maintenance of a 
decentralized global jihadist movement. Indeed, this structure was probably vital for an 
organization that was deprived of its geographical base and scattered across the globe. 
Yet, there seems to be a certain hierarchy among the jihadist media groups, and just as 
there reportedly still exists a leadership of al-Qaeda, a few media organizations have 
seemingly emerged as ‘leaders of the media jihad’ . These are primarily the groups that 
have been presented as global media companies in this study, and that act as the main 
‘authenthificators’  and ‘agenda setters’ . It is, after all, these groups that often promote the 
numerous new jihadist online media groups. 
When considering the jihadist web as a whole, the jihadist discussion forums 
emerge as the most important nodes. This is the space where media material is made 
available to supporters, and where seemingly important communicative exchanges take 
place. A trend seen over the last years indicates a shift away from the use of official, non-
interactive jihadist websites for propagation of the media material. As previously 
mentioned, the local media groups seem to have outsourced this distribution work to 
‘professional media entities’ . The distribution of media material to web forums appears to 
follow a rather sophisticated system, consisting of in-advance advertisement, responsible 
correspondents, and simultaneous releases on the most prominent forums. Consequently, 
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the web forums seem to have materialized as the most important venue for jihadist media 
campaigns. One could argue that one of the reasons for this development is security 
measures taken by the jihadists: permanent official sites are easier to track to individuals 
and to shut down, whereas owners or moderators of web forums may disclaim the 
responsibility for content on sites. 
On another note, the use of discussion forums as main vehicles for jihadist media 
material stands out as highly useful for observers of the media jihad. Monitoring these 
interactive sites gives an insight into the mind of ordinary jihadists, as well as the 
strategies, tactics and ideologies they follow. It also reflects the status of jihadist media 
material: the commentaries that members of the forums express at the release of a new 
video or statement, as well as the number of downloads, may help interpret the 
importance and popularity – or lack thereof – of specific media companies and issuances. 
It should be noted that these main nodes of the jihadist media campaign are mostly in the 
Arabic language. The exceptions are a few prominent English, French and German-
language discussion forums, accompanied by an increasing effort by the media 
companies to translate material into foreign languages. All media companies examined in 
this study are originally Arabic-language initiatives.298 
Arguably, the use of forums with active participation of members also makes the 
media jihad ‘self-sustainable’ . Forum members themselves provide for the re-distribution 
of material, and also for information about new URLs to often unstable sites. This assures 
continuity not only of the media campaign, but also of the organizational architecture of a 
decentralized movement. 
 
Prominence of media jihad 
When observing the jihadist web, it appears that the campaign carried out by the 
media groups fills a major role in this virtual world. Since the jihadist online media not 
only covers the traditional issues of the mainstream mass-media, but also facilitates, 
among other things, communicative exchanges on religious, military, ideological and 
strategic levels, it is perhaps not surprising that it attracts substantial attention. Yet, it is 
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well-known amongst observers of ‘jihadism online’  that the phenomenon also consists of 
other factors, such as financing, reconnaissance, or hacking, and promotes other voices 
than those spread by the media groups.299 A pertinent question therefore remains: How 
important is in fact the jihadist online media campaign? 
We know that in the past, high ranking jihadists have held important roles in the 
media jihad. Now imprisoned al-Qaeda strategist ’Ab Muab al-Sr is revealed to have 
served as a media advisor to Osama bin Laden. Moreover, Khlid Shaykh Muammad, 
the alleged 9/11-mastermind, reportedly led as-Sab Media Production Company in its 
early days, along with al-Qaeda’ s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, and assisted 
by online jihadist ’ Irhb 007. Such familiar names offer authority to the media jihad. 
Today’ s leaders of the media groups seem to be less well-known, although it is difficult 
to assess their identity as the Internet offers relative anonymity to users. 
Another possible means to determine the actual status of jihadist online media is 
the reference to such material as sources of inspiration in court testimonies of captured 
jihadists. Here, the Internet is frequently mentioned as a ‘radicalizing factor’ , and jihadist 
video material is reportedly often seized in their property. The investigations following 
the Madrid train bombings, for instance, revealed the use of jihadist discussion forums 
and jihadist proselytizing websites, as well as specific jihadist online media material from 
the Global Islamic Media, Azzm Publications, ’Ansr al-Sunna Media, and “ al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula” ’ s media wing.300 
Nevertheless, it may be difficult to assess the influence of the jihadist media 
campaign on supporters of the movement and on the general public opinion, a topic 
outside the scope of this study. Yet, compared to other functions of ‘jihadism online’ , the 
media campaign seems from these preliminary findings to hold a prominent position, 
based on, if nothing else, its sheer quantity, increasing quality, and the praise it receives 
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by online supporters, as well as the growing attention and concern by counter-terrorism 
agencies.301 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
A Comprehensive, Applied, Jihadist Media Strategy? 
 
This study’ s hypothesis suggested that the current jihadist online media campaign 
originates from a defined strategy for using the media for terrorist purposes. Findings 
from the analysis of primary sources have led this author to argue that there exist jihadist 
strategic thoughts about this issue, and that jihadist media campaigns in most cases 
adhere to these. It seems important to stress the plurality of this phenomenon. There 
appears to be not one jihadist media strategy and one media campaign, but rather a 
number of strategies, leading to a number of campaigns that cohabitate the jihadist web. 
Indeed, the phenomenon of jihadist online media is still developing, and it is difficult to 
determine its exact shape. Looking at the ‘broader jihadist picture’ , the jihadist online 
media campaign, while facilitating the achievement of certain premeditated goals, seems 
also to play a role on a tactical level. In fact, the media jihad appears to serve an overall 
jihadist strategy rather than being an end in itself – just like the entire doctrine of jihad is 
commonly viewed not as an end but as “ a means to rid the world of a greater evil” . 302 
Even so, the fact that the jihadist online media campaign is growing, frequently opening 
new virtual fronts, certainly seems to be a sign of a jihadist perception of the Internet as a 
purposeful vehicle for strategic communication. 
Findings from this study further support this assumption: Jihadist online media is 
used for framing and agenda setting, and facilitates the accomplishment of a number of 
strategic goals of communication. Indeed, the fact that the jihadists exercise ownership 
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and control over mass-media outlets on the Internet makes the jihadist media campaign 
more functional, i.e. facilitating the achievement of additional strategic goals of 
communication, than when relying on mainstream media channels. The Internet also 
allows for dispersed groups and individuals to participate in the media jihad, leading to 
increased quantity, and diversity and decentralization of the campaign. On the one hand, 
this situation may promote a sense of community among geographically scattered jihadist 
supporters. Recent developments also indicate that the media jihadists make serious 
efforts to incorporate new target groups, with multi–language and –culture productions. 
On the other hand, a diversified and decentralized media campaign allows for internal 
debates and disputes to emerge in the open. It also may allow for critical voices to mix 
with the official jihadist message, potentially distorting the prevailing global jihadist 
narrative. Nevertheless, the jihadist online media campaign appears so far to be a driving 
force for the maintenance and development of the movement, as it spreads the messages 
of global jihadism, invites individuals to participate, educates, and creates and preserves 
bonds between various factions of the movement. Although we have in recent times 
witnessed jihadist use of other channels of communication, the Internet and the jihadist 
online media groups will most likely remain essential vehicles and drivers of the jihadist 
media campaign. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Schmid and de Graaf, Violence as Communication, Sage Publications, London, 1982 
 
List of insurgent terrorist uses of the news media (pp.53-54): 
 
A. Active Uses 
1. Communication of (fear-) messages to mass audience 
2. Polarizing public opinion 
3. Making converts, attracting new members to terrorist movement 
4. Demanding publication of manifesto under threat of harm to victim 
5. Using media as conduits for threats, demands and bargaining messages 
6. Verifying demand compliance by the enemy 
7. Winning favourable publicity via released hostages 
8. Linking message to victim 
9. Misleading enemy by spreading false information 
10. Winning publicity by granting interviews in the underground 
11. Intimidating media by killing or wounding journalists 
12. Advertising terrorist movement and cause presented 
13. Arousing public concern for victim to pressure government to concessions 
14. Discrediting victim by making his ‘confessions’  public 
15. Discrediting enemy by making victim’ s ‘confessions’  public 
16. Deflecting public attention form disliked issue by bombing it from front pages 
17. Announcing further actions 
18. Using journalists as negotiators in bargaining situation 
19. Inciting public against government 
20. Occupation of broadcasting stations to issue message 
21. Boosting one’ s own morale; Herostratism 
22. Gaining Robin Hood image 
 
B. Passive Uses 
23. External communication 
24. Learning new coercive techniques from media reports on terrorism 
25. Obtaining information about identity and status of hostages 
26. Obtaining information on countermeasures by security forces 
27. Using media presence at site of siege as insurance against ‘dirty tricks’  by security forces 
28. Creating fear with the enemy by media’ s exaggeration of own strength, thereby reducing 
likelihood that individual policemen dare to apprehend terrorist 
29. Identifying future targets for terroristic violence 
30. Obtaining information about public reaction to terroristic act 
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